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I. INTRODUCTION
After being falsely accused of theft and detained for several hours at the
local shopping mall in Smalltown, Indiana, Ms. Smith contacts an attorney, who
must consider whether to take the case on a contingency basis.' Ms. Smith
suffered no physical injuries, just a little embarrassment and humiliation. Her
attorney has heard about others being held at this particular shopping mall and
believes this case presents an opportunity to punish the mall and stop this type
of thing from happening again. The attorney evaluates what might happen. She
could bring a tort action seeking compensatory and punitive damages. If
settlement conferences prove unsuccessful, a trial might result. After a three
day trial, a jury could very well award Ms. Smith $1000 in compensatory
damages for her mental anguish and $11,000 in punitive damages. The
shopping mall would then pay $12,000 to the clerk of the court, who would
allocate $8250 to the state of Indiana, and $3750 to Ms. Smith, who would then
pay her attorney a third (or $1250). After some consideration of the idea, the
attorney apologizes to Ms. Smith and declines the case.
A troublesome irony surrounds efforts to limit punitive damage awards.
Punitive damages are quasi-criminal sanctions leveled in civil actions when a
defendant's conduct is found especially reprehensible. 2 Punitive damages
punish defendants and are designed to deter similar conduct in the future.3
Unlike criminal penalties, punitive damages are not sought by state
prosecutors. 4 In the appropriate situations, plaintiffs may seek such "penalties"
and place themselves in the role of "private attorneys general."'

1. This hypothetical situation, the name of the tort victim, and the town are fictitious and are
used to illustrate the impact of Indiana's punitive damages allocation statute, IND. CODE ANN. § 3451-3-1 to -6 (West Supp. 1998).
2. 1 DAN B. DOBBS, REMEDIES § 3.11(l) (2d ed. 1993); David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages
Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL. L. REV. 363, 365 (1994).
3. Owen, supra note 2, at 377-78. In Indiana, punitive damages are clearly understood as
limited to punishment and deterrent functions. See Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of
Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975 (Ind. 1993) (noting that punitive damages in Indiana are
designed to punish the wrongdoer and dissuade from similar conduct in the future).
4. See Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/PrivateDistinction,
40 ALA. L. REV. 1079 (1989). Professor Harris argues that the distinction between tort law as
"private" enforcement and criminal law as "public" has traditionally broken down when applied to
punitive damages. Id. at 1099. This conventional analysis of punitive damages resounds in Orkin
Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019 (Ind. 1986). "[The sole issues [concerning an
award of punitive damages] are whether or not the Defendant's conduct was so obdurate that he
should be punished for the benefit of the general public. Punitive damages may be likened to a fine
imposed for breach of the criminal statutes." Id. at 1022.
5. Owen, supra note 2, at 381 (stating that "the prospect of punitive damages awards serve as
a kind of bounty, inducing injured victims to serve as 'private attorneys general,' increasing the
number of wrongdoers who are pursued, prosecuted and eventually brought to justice").

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol32/iss3/4

Parkinson: A Shift in the Windfall: An Analysis of Indiana's Punitive Damage

1998]

INDIANA'S PUNITIVE DAMAGES STATUTE

925

Concerns about the increasing size and frequency of punitive damage
awards have resulted in serious reconsideration of the usefulness of punitive
damage awards and the propriety of awarding punitive damages to plaintiffs. 6
Numerous commentators have suggested limiting punitive damage awards or
awarding punitive damages to the state rather than to plaintiffs. 7 Critics of
punitive damage awards point out that allowing plaintiffs to profit from punitive
damage awards results in "windfalls" 8 to the plaintiffs and serves neither the
punishment nor the deterrent functions of punitive damages. 9 As the number
of proposals to reform punitive damage awards have increased, so have the
number of ways to reward the plaintiffs attorney for arguing the case for

6. For an excellent analysis of the various criticisms of punitive damages, see Owen, supra note
2, at 382-400. See also Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on
Women, Blue Collar Workers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 673 (1996). Rustad argues that
there never has been a tort "crisis" and presents findings from the nine empirical studies that have
been conducted on punitive damage awards, concluding that "[tihe key finding of every empirical
study of punitive damages is that the number and size of awards do not indicate a nationwide
litigation crisis." Id. at 702.
7. See ABA REPORT OF THE ACTION COMMISSION TO IMPROVE THE TORT LIABILITY SYSTEM
19 (1987). Many other proposals followed. See, e.g., Janie L. Shores, A Suggestion for Limited
Tort Reform: Allocation of Punitive Damage Awards to Eliminate Windfalls, 44 ALA. L. REV. 61
(1992). Justice Shores, a member of the Alabama Supreme Court, traces the history of punitive
damages and addresses the myths and realities of the tort "crisis." Id. at 62-84. She then proposes
that judges award punitive damages to the state to maintain the deterrent effect of punitive damages
while avoiding the perceived plaintiffs windfall. Id. at 90-91. "By such a procedure, the dual
purposes of punitive damages are served: punishment of the defendant and deterrence of that
defendant and others who might act similarly." Id. at 91. See also E. Jeffrey Grube, Note, Punitive
Damages: A Misplaced Remedy, 66 S.CAL. L. REV. 839, 851 (1993) ("[i]f some entity must be
compensated for the malicious, aggravated, or outrageous conduct of the defendant, it should be
society rather than the plaintiff"); Lynda A. Sloane, Note, The Split Award Statute: A Move Toward
Effectuating the True Purpose of Punitive Damages, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 473, 505 (1993) (finding
.no justification for allowing only one member of society to collect monies that are awarded in the
interest of society at large").
8. See Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting):
Punitive damages are generally seen as a windfall to plaintiffs, who are entitled to receive full
compensation for their injuries-but no more. Even assuming that a punitive "fine" should
be imposed after a civil trial, the penalty should go to the State, not to the plaintiff-who by
hypothesis is fully compensated.
Id. at 59. Others consider any amount over and above the plaintiff's actual damages plus costs and
attorneys' fees to be a windfall. Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiff's Windfall from
Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1900 (1992) (hereinafter Economic Analysis)
(identifying a "windfall" as an award of punitive damages beyond the amount necessary to: (1)
punish the defendant, (2) deter the defendant's similar conduct, and, as a secondary goal, (3)
compensate the plaintiff for the litigation costs incurred). But see Owen, supra note 2, at 378-79
(discussing the functions of a punitive damages award as including a compensatory role). Professor
Owen argues that the plaintiffs responsibility for the costs and the attorney's fees, often leaving the
plaintiff worse off than before the injury, "provides a compelling argument for punitive damages in
appropriate cases." Id. at 379.
9. Grube, supra note 7, at 850-52. Only a minority of states hold to the theory that punitive
damages are meant to compensate the victim. See infra note 40.
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punitive damages. ' Thus, the inherent irony in placing limitations on punitive
damages is this: if a plaintiffs attorney is not compensated in a manner which
makes the time and effort of arguing for punitive damages worthwhile,
reprehensible conduct goes unpunished.
In 1995, Indiana joined the list of states that have limited punitive damage
awards when it enacted an "allocation"" statute in House Enrolled Act
1741.2 The Act places a substantive cap on punitive damages at the greater
of $50,000 or three times the compensatory damage award. 3 Seventy-five
percent of the punitive damage award is allocated to the state for deposit in a
compensation fund for victims of violent crime,14 and the remaining twentyfive percent 5 is awarded to the plaintiff. The Act, however, fails to mention
when or to what extent the state becomes involved in collecting a punitive
damage award, neither does it mention compensating plaintiffs' attorneys for
arguing the case for punitive damages. Any windfall that comes as a result of

a punitive damage award now falls into the coffers of the state treasury. This
10. Compare Sloane, supra note 7, at 493 (proposing that plaintiff should pay attorney out of
plaintiff's share of the punitive damage award), with Grube, supra note 7, at 856 (proposing that
state should pay plaintiffs attorney an amount equal to the costs of arguing the case for imposing
punitive damages).
11. This note refers to statutes which allocate a portion of the punitive damages to the state as
"allocation statutes." Other commentators refer to "split recovery statutes" or "split award
statutes." All such terminology refers to the same phenomenon: a statute which awards a certain
percentage of each punitive damage award away from the plaintiff.
12. House Enrolled Act 1741 did four things. First, it addressed products liability, limiting
which manufacturers can be held responsible for defective products. IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-3
(West Supp. 1996). Second, it introduced comparative fault in product liability actions. IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-4-33-5 (West Supp. 1996). Third, it capped punitive damages and allocated 75 % of any
punitive damage award to a state-run fund for victims of violent crime. IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-513-4 to -6 (West Supp. 1998). Finally, it addressed offers of settlement and provided sanctions for
failing to settle. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-50-1-1 (West Supp. 1998). See also Frederick R. Hovde,
Analysis of Indiana Tort Reform 1995: The Effects ofHouse Enrolled Act 1741, 29 IND. L. REV. 365
(1995); James L. Petersen, Tort Reform, Act No. 1741, RES GESTAE, Sept. 1995, at 24; Andrew P.
Wirick & Ann Marie Waldron Piscione, Tort Law Reform (?) and Other Developments in Indiana
Tort Law, 29 IND. L. REv. 1097 (1996). Only the statutory cap on punitive damages and the
allocation of the award are within the scope of this note.
13. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West Supp. 1998).
14. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998). The fund was established by IND.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-40 (West Supp. 1997) and is funded through various sanctions and fines.
IND. CODE ANN. § 5-2-6.1-41 (West Supp. 1997). Awards are made to victims of violent crime
who meet certain criteria and cover medical and, in some cases, burial expenses. IND. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-6.1-21 (West Supp. 1997). A party awarded compensation under the fund may apply to
receive attorney's fees "commensurate with services rendered to the claimant." IND. CODE ANN.
§ 5-2-6.1-37 (West Supp. 1997).
15. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6(b)(1) (West Supp. 1998). The Act makes exception for
damages awarded in actions brought under the Hazardous Substances Response Act. Punitive
damages from settlements or judgments brought pursuant to this Act get deposited in the Hazardous
Substances Response Trust Fund. IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-4-1 (West Supp. 1996).
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Note proposes changes to the Indiana statute that will continue to encourage
plaintiffs' attorneys to seek awards to punish and deter egregious conduct, while
maintaining the legitimate aims of the tort reform movement in preventing
unjustified windfalls for plaintiffs. 6
In the last ten years, attempts to limit punitive damage awards have
increased. 7 Several cases awarding punitive damages have reached the United
States Supreme Court to be scrutinized for constitutionality and have arisen from
states with no substantive limitations on the amount of punitive damages awarded
by juries." In 1996, Congress proposed, but failed to enact, a tort reform bill
that would pre-empt state laws and place both substantive and procedural limits
on punitive damage awards. 9
Some states have enacted statutory caps that place a specific dollar amount
on the punitive damages that may be awarded. 2' Reform advocates argue that

16. See infra notes 326-35 and accompanying text.
17. See James R. McKown, Punitive Damages:State Trends andDevelopments, 14 REV. LMG.
419 (1995) (discussing litigation in the state courts). McKown reviews state statutes that share the
punitive damage award with the state. Id. at 436. The author also details recent state court
litigation concerning the factors that will be reviewed when a damage award is appealed. Id. at 44344. State courts are now implementing more difficult burdens for plaintiffs to meet. Id. at 455.
18. See, e.g., BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996); Honda Motor
Co. v. Oberg, 114 S. Ct. 2331 (1994); TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S.
443 (1993); Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991).
19. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). Congressional Republicans included the bill, entitled the
Common Sense Legal Reform Act, in their "Contract with America" in 1994. Rustad, supra note
6, at 674. President Clinton vetoed the legislation, but strategists in the Republican congressional
majority hint that the legislation will be reintroduced. Saundra Torry, Both Sides Tote up the Votes
for Tort Reform Redux, WASH. POST, Nov. 25, 1996, at F7.
20. Currently, 14 states have enacted statutory caps on punitive damage awards: COLO. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(l)(a) (West 1989) (punitive damages may not exceed actual damages);
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (in products liability cases, punitive damages may
not exceed two times compensatory damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(a & b) (West Supp.
1997) (punitive damage awards over three times compensatory damages create a presumption of
excessiveness); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Michie Supp. 1997) (no limitation in products liability
actions or where there is specific intent; otherwise, punitive damages are capped at $250,000); 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1115.05 (West Supp. 1997) (punitive damages capped at three times
compensatory damages, but not available in legal malpractice or "healing arts" actions); IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West Supp. 1998) (punitive damages limited to the greater of three times
compensatory damages or $50,000); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(e) (1996) (punitive damages may
not exceed the lesser of the defendant's income, $5,000,000, or one and a half times the profit
gained from the tortious activity); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (Michie 1996) (in certain
actions, punitive damages may not exceed three times compensatory damages, if compensatory
damages exceed $100,000, or $300,000, if compensatory damages are less than $100,000); N.C.
GEN STAT. § ID-25 (1996) (punitive damages limited to three times compensatory damages or
$250,000; exempts drunk driving tort actions from cap); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (1997)
(necessity of compensatory damages; punitive damages capped at twice the compensatory award or
$250,000); Oio REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (D)(1)(a & b) (Banks-Baldwin 1997) (limits punitive
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punitive damages are essentially civil fines that should be awarded to the state,
and a number of states have responded by enacting allocation statutes that split
the recovery and allocate a portion of the punitive damage award to the state.21
These statutes have survived federal and state constitutional challenges that the
allocation effects a taking of the plaintiff's vested property interest in the
23
judgment22 and an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment.
Because the award now closely approximates a civil penalty paid to the state,
defendants may challenge damage awards as excessive fines. 24
This Note examines Indiana's recently enacted allocation statute and argues
in favor of amending the statute to compensate plaintiffs' attorneys for winning
the punitive damages allocated to the state under the statute. The Indiana statute
currently does not provide an incentive for plaintiffs' attorneys to pursue a claim
for punitive damages. Part II of this Note provides an introductory background
on the nature and functions of punitive damages' and discusses the relevant
United States Supreme Court decisions of the last few years.26 Part III surveys
the tort reform movement, discussing various efforts to limit litigation, from

damages to the greater of three times compensatory damages or $100,000, unless the defendant is
categorized as a "large employer," in which case the award may be three time compensatory
damages or $250,000); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.1(B) (West 1997) (punitive damages limited
to the greater of actual damages or $100,000; when the award results from an intentional offense,
punitive damages capped at the greater of twice compensatory damages, $500,000, or the increased
financial benefit derived by the defendant or insurer as a direct result of the conduct causing injury
to the plaintiff); TEX. CIV. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.008 (West 1997) (punitive damages
limited to twice economic damages plus noneconomic loss or $200,000, whichever is greater); VA.
CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie 1997) (punitive damages may not exceed $350,000).
21. Nine states have such statutory schemes: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1997);
GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1996); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp.
1996); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(2)(b) (West
1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1994); Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (Supp. 1997); OR. REV.
STAT. § 18.540 (1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (Michie 1996).
22. See Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (no vested property right in award of
punitive damages); State v. Mosely, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (no vested property right in award
of punitive damages); Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue & Assoc., Inc., 473
N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991) (no right to award of punitive damages). But see Kirk v. Denver Publ'g
Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (plaintiffs right to punitive damage award is vested; allocation
statute amounts to a taking of that right).
23. McBride v. General Motors Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990) (allocation statute
transforms punitive damage award into civil fine extracted by state in violation of the Eighth
Amendment); Matthew J. Klaben, Note, Split-Recovery Statutes: The Interplay of the Takings and
Excessive Fines Clauses, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 104, 125 (1994).
24. Klaben, supra note 23, at 140. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected an Eighth Amendment
excessive fines argument in a case involving civil parties where no portion of the award went to the
state in Browning-FerrisIndustries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 38-61 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 62-108 and accompanying text.
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caps on attorney's contingency fees to the allocation statutes that direct a portion
of the punitive damages award to the state.
Analyzing other allocation
schemes and the challenges to them provides insight into Indiana's newly
adopted and as yet unchallenged statute.
Part IV provides an analysis of Indiana's statute, detailing the history of its
enactment and critiquing its language.2" Part V identifies several potential
problems with the statute based on the experiences of other states that have
adopted allocation statutes. 29 This Note examines the potential problems with
the Indiana statute in light of the challenges made to allocation statutes in other
states and analyzes Indiana's statute as a violation of the Indiana Bill of
Rights.' Indiana's statute may be challenged as a taking of a vested property
right in the judgment, as has been argued in other states.3' Then this Note
examines the impairment of contracts argument which has also been made.32
In addition, attorneys have made equitable arguments for fees on the amount of
the award allocated to the state.33 This Note concludes that these three
arguments will fail in Indiana as they have in other states. However, one
argument that has not been attempted in other states is based on a theory
analogous to a section of the Indiana Bill of Rights that prohibits the state from
demanding a person's particular services without just compensation.'
This
Note argues that failing to compensate the attorney for arguing the case for
punitive damages becomes a demand on the attorney's services which must be
compensated. 3s
Part VI proposes amendments to the Indiana allocation statute to remedy
these concerns. 36 This Note argues that compensating plaintiffs' attorneys for
winning punitive damage awards that are allocated to the state retains the
punishment and deterrent functions of punitive damages and priorities of the tort
reform movement, encourages plaintiffs to bring suit to punish reprehensible
conduct, and avoids potential ethical conflicts between attorneys and clients.37

27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes
See infra notes

109-73 and accompanying text.
196-233 and accompanying text.
234-48 and accompanying text.
241-303 and accompanying text.
241-45 and accompanying text.
246-58 and accompanying text.
252-58 and accompanying text.
259-81 and accompanying text.
282-303 and accompanying text.
319-35 and accompanying text.
304-10 and accompanying text.
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AN OVERVIEW OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. The Functions of a Punitive Damage Award
When a defendant's tortious conduct is especially egregious or outrageous,
tort law allows for the assessment of a civil fine known as punitive or exemplary
damages. 38
By definition, punitive damages are meant to punish the
perpetrator of a tort and deter similar egregious conduct from occurring in the
future.39 Unlike compensatory damages, punitive damages are not meant to
compensate the victim of a tort.' Unlike ordinary civil or criminal fines paid

38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) (1979); 1 LINDA L. SCHLUErER & KENNETH
R. REDDEN, PUNMVE DAMAGES § 2.1 (1995). Punitive damages have also been referred to as
.smart money," "plenary," "aggravated," and "imaginary" damages. Owen, supra note 2, at 364
n. 1. In theory, punitive damage awards find justification in moral principles. David G. Owen, The
Moral Foundationsof Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L. REV. 705 (1989). Professor Owen argues that
punitive damages should be examined using a "theft" metaphor. Id. at 709-10. Because each
individual is surrounded by a "bubble of rights space," the tortfeasor who invades this bubble has
"stolen" the tort victim's autonomy. Id. at 711. This theft is uncompensated by regular
compensatory damages, but is compensable through a punitive damage award. Thus, punitive
damages which compensate a victim for the loss of autonomy are steeped in the moral foundation
of freedom. Id. Additionally, punitive damages are justified by the moral foundation of utility.
Id. at 713. Because punitive damages perform a utilitarian function and provide a net benefit to
society-the deterrence of future egregious conduct-punitive damages are morally sound. Id.
Furthermore, Professor Owen believes that punitive damages serve to reinforce egalitarian notions
of balancing power between individuals and help to deter abuses of power and trust. Id. at 716.
39. Owen, supra note 2, at 377. For a contrary view, see E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive
Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053 (1989). Elliott
argues that, because punitive damages may not be predicted, they have very little deterrent effect
on corporate behavior. Id. at 1059. Rather, corporations plan accordingly based on "information
about the liability of consequences of specific predictability." Id. at 1058. Professor Dobbs finds
three deterrent capabilities in punitive damage awards: removing the profitability of tortious
behavior which is profitable even beyond the compensatory award; serving as an alternative to
issuing injunctive orders to cease reprehensible conduct; and serving as an example for others.
DOBBS, supra note 2, § 3.11(3). In the case of dignitary torts, which are torts that do not require
a physical "impact" for the plaintiff to recover damages for emotional distress, the line between
compensation for the plaintiff and punishment for the defendant is less clear. See DOBBS, supra note
2, § 3.3(6).
40. In Michigan, punitive damages are not available unless authorized by statute or as an
element of the compensatory damages award. Eide v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 427 N.W.2d 488 (Mich.
1988). The Eide court detailed the curious lineage of the Michigan treatment of punitive damages
as an element of the compensatory award, tracing it to Michigan Supreme Court Justice Cooley,
who, in a 1884 case, wrote that it was altogether proper that the jury consider the aggravated harm
suffered by the plaintiff when estimating compensation. Eide, 427 N.W.2d at 498 (citing Stilson
v. Gibbs, 18 N.W. 815 (Mich. 1884)). The Eide court noted that the precedent remained good law
in Michigan, ruling that punitive, or exemplary, damages could not be awarded unless specifically
authorized by statute or as an element of the compensatory award. Eide, 427 N.W.2d at 501.
Similarly, a Connecticut decision is frequently cited as support for the idea that punitive damages
have some compensatory functions. Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825 (Conn.
1967). The Collens court noted that, while punitive damages are not "nominally compensatory,"
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by the defendant to the state,4' punitive damages are traditionally awarded to
the plaintiff along with compensatory damages. 42 Critics characterize an
unusually high punitive damage award as an unjustified "windfall" for the
43
plaintiff.
Punitive damages, because they are quasi-criminal penalties inflicted upon
a defendant in a civil trial, will always be disputed and their availability
questioned." In some states, punitive damages are not allowed.4' Of the
states that-allow for the awarding of punitive damages, some require that such
punitive damages be prayed for in the complaint.46 As a result, a request for

they have the "fact and effect" of being compensation for the plaintiff. Collens, 234 A.2d at 831.
The court then went on to limit such punitive damages to the costs of litigation. Id. at 831-32. See
SCHLEIJTER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 2.2(B), for a discussion of how punitive damages may help
a plaintiff pay litigation costs. This function of punitive damages can be considered compensation
for the "private attorney general" function of seeking punitive damages.
Changes made to the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (1988), in 1986 made
.whistleblowing" a rewarding endeavor. Elletta Sangrey Callahan & Terry Morehead Dworkin, Do
Good and Get Rich: FinancialIncentivesfor Whistleblowing and the False Claims Act, 37 VILL. L.
REV. 273 (1992). The False Claims Act was originally a response by the federal government to the
multitude of padded invoices during the Civil War. Id. at 302. Citizens were encouraged to bring
actions on behalf of the government, exposing fraudulent claims made by contractors. Id. As a
reward for such "whistleblowing," the citizens were allowed to keep a portion of the recovered
funds. Id.
41. In Indiana, penalties or fines may be imposed for a wide variety of civil or criminal
misdemeanors or felonies, ranging from speeding tickets to fines for felonious assault. See, e.g.,
IND* CODE ANN. § 13-30-4-1 (West Supp. 1996) (violations of environmental management laws);
IND. CODE ANN. § 6-7-3-11 (West Supp. 1996) (failure to pay controlled substance excise tax); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-4 (West Supp. 1996) (fines as alternative penalties for the commission of a
class A felony).
42. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 3.1 (1993). Although a plaintiff seeks to be made whole, or
recover all that has been taken as a result of the tort, the underlying reality is that the plaintiff will
never be put in the same position as before the tort. Id. at 281 n. 17. The plaintiff will have some
costs associated with recovering what has been lost or taken. Because each side is responsible for
paying their own attorney's fees and court costs, the plaintiff would have to recover an amount over
and above simple compensatory damages. Id. at 282.
43. See Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 1903. Much has been made about the plaintiff's
windfall in a case involving punitive damages. Critics refer to a case involving punitive damages
as the chance of a lifetime for plaintiffs. See Richard D. Walton, Rhetoric Heats up as Senate
Considers Tort Reform Bill, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Mar. 21, 1995, at C3 (quoting Indianapolis
attorney Ronald Gifford as saying punitive damages "have become the judicial equivalent of playing
the Hoosier Lottery").
44. See Shores, supra note 7, at 7O-90 (discussing the rhetoric of the critics of punitive damages
and efforts to reform the tort liability system).
45. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (Michie 1997). Louisiana civil law does not allow
punitive damages. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. ART. § 2315 (West 1979 & Supp. 1997). Massachusetts,
Alabama, and Washington interpret statutory law only to allow for compensatory damages, with
some exceptions. Owen, supra note 2, at 369-70 n.30.
46. See SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 4.2(A)(3).
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punitive damages can often be a tool used by plaintiffs to reach a quick
settlement with defendants. 7 However, substantive and procedural limitations
do exist. 8 The conduct for which punitive damages may be awarded usually
must be "egregious" and must be demonstrated by "clear and convincing"
proof.4 9 Many states require actual damages before punitive damages will be
awarded.5 0 Still, the fact that punitive damages are available in civil actions
as an added source of potential liability for defendants makes punitive damage
awards an obvious target for tort reformers." Indeed, while compensatory
awards are difficult to cap,5" caps on punitive damage awards, which are
arbitrarily fixed, are a means to decrease a defendant's total financial tort
liability .3
Defendants frequently challenge punitive damage awards on constitutional
grounds.5 4 Most frequently, high punitive damage awards are appealed as
violations of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 5 or state

47. James A. Breslo, Comment, Taking the PunitiveDamage Windfall away from the Plaintiff:
An Analysis, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 1130, 1158 (1992).
48. See McKown, supra note 17, at 446-61 (discussing state reform efforts, including the
bifurcation of trials, and articulating standards of proof necessary for awards of punitive damages).
49. DOBBS, supra note 2, § 3.11(4). For a discussion of the "elevated" burden of proof
required and examples of jury instructions for several states, see SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supranote
38, § 5.3(H). Indiana requires the same "clear and convincing" evidentiary standard of proof. Erie
Ins. Co. v. Hickman, 622 N.E.2d 515, 520 (Ind. 1993).
50. Indiana requires at least a nominal compensatory award before punitive damages may be
awarded. Arlington State Bank v. Colvin, 545 N.E.2d 572 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (adopting the
Seventh Circuit reasoning that at least one dollar in compensatory damages must be awarded before
a plaintiff may recover punitive damages). See also DOBBS, supra note 2, § 3.11 (10).
51. See Elliott, supra note 39, at 1058.
52. In 1975, Indiana enacted a cap on damages in medical malpractice actions. IND. CODE
ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West Supp. 1998). The amount of damages recoverable are now capped at
$750,000 per occurrence. Id. For an analysis of the effects of the cap in relation to other midwest
states without medical malpractice caps on damages, see Eleanor D. Kinney et al., Indiana'sMedical
Malpractice Act: Results of a Three-Year Study, 24 IND. L. REV. 1275, 1295-99 (1991). The
Indiana Supreme Court upheld the act against an array of constitutional challenges in Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980).
53. See DOBBS, supra note 2, § 3.11(15) (summarizing the arguments made on both sides of
the debate over reforming punitive damage awards).
54. See generally DOBBS, supra note 2, § 3.11(12); SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, §
3.0; Bruce J. Ennis, PunitiveDamages and the U.S. Constitution, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 587 (1990)
(arguing that the U.S. Supreme Court would be unlikely to issue a ruling which would substantially
change punitive damages litigation based on the Excessive Fines, the Due Process, or the Contract
Clauses).
55. SCHLUJETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, §§ 3.3, 3.4. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v.
Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S, 443 (1993) (holding that the Due Process Clause puts a
substantive limit on how much a jury can award in punitive damages).
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constitutional equivalents.56 Most juries are given guidelines for the awarding
of punitive damages, and these damages are often considered in bifurcated
proceedings. 7 Unbridled discretion given to juries to award punitive damages
violates due process when the damages are "grossly excessive."58 On appeal,
punitive damage awards are scrutinized for "reasonableness." 9 State courts
must first reviewed damage awards in accordance with state common law or
statutory standards.' Occasionally, a punitive damage award leveled by a state
jury and reviewed through the state appellate process is nonetheless challenged
as grossly excessive in violation of the U.S. Constitution.61
B. Recent Supreme Court Developments
In several high profile cases in the last ten years, the U.S. Supreme Court
has affirmed three basic principles concerning punitive damage awards. First,
punitive damages are not meant to compensate plaintiffs.62 Second, the
traditional common law method of allowing juries to award punitive damages is
not a per se unconstitutional violation of procedural due process, although
individual awards may violate due process if "grossly excessive. "63 And,
third, when awards are made to private plaintiffs in civil lawsuits, they may not
be challenged as violations of the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment."' Along the way, the Court has expressed concern about the
increasing frequency and size of punitive damage awards, but, in general, the
awards have been upheld.'

56. See Lazarus Dept. Store v. Sutherlin, 544 N.E.2d 513 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (award of
punitive damages challenged as violation of Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution and
violation of Article 1, Section 16 of the Indiana Constitution which prohibits excessive fines).
57. See SCHLuErER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 4.2(B) (discussing the defendant's motion to
bifurcate).
58. BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589, 1592, 1609 (1996).
59. In BMWof North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996), the U.S. Supreme Court
discussed three factors in considering the reasonableness of a punitive damage award: the degree
of reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct; the ratio of punitive damages to actual compensatory
damages; and equivalent sanctions for comparable misconduct.
60. In Indiana, awards of punitive damages will only be sustained in cases where there is "clear
and convincing" proof of conduct requiring punishment and deterrence. Bud Wolf Chevrolet, Inc.
v. Robertson, 519 N.E.2d 135, 137 (Ind. 1988). Appellate review of an award of punitive damages
will uphold an award if reasonable. Id.
61. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 38, § 3.4.
62. O'Gilvie v. United States, 117 S. Ct. 452, 457 (1996).
63. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1595.
64. Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 260, 263-64
(1989).
65. Until 1996, the Supreme Court refused to strike a state jury award of punitive damages as
a violation of due process. See BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996)
(overturning a punitive damage award of $2 million, stating that the award was grossly excessive
in violation of the Due Process Clause).
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In the recent case, O'Gilvie v. United States,66 the Court stated decisively
that punitive damages are not meant to compensate plaintiffs.67 At issue was
a damage award in a tort action that the plaintiff reported as income on a joint
tax retum. 6s Later, the plaintiff sought to have the amount refunded pursuant
to the tax code exemption for damages awarded as a result of personal injuries
or sickness. 69 The Court held that, for tax purposes, punitive damages are not

received on account of personal injuries.7 To demonstrate congressional intent
to hold punitive damages taxable, the Court relied on amendments to the tax
code enacted in 1989 that specifically included punitive damages as taxable
income." However, the decision merely restated the commonly held notion
that punitive damages are not meant to compensate plaintiffs.'
While the non-compensatory nature of punitive damages may no longer be
an issue, defendants have challenged the manner in which punitive damages are
awarded as a violation of due process in Pacific Mutual Insurance Co. v.
Haslip.7 The Haslip defendant, an insurance company whose agent had
breached a fiduciary duty by not applying premium payments to insured
customers' accounts,74 challenged an award of $840,000 in punitive

66. 117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
67. See supra note 40 and accompanying text for a discussion of the compensation debate
concerning punitive damages.
68. O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 452. In the underlying action, the survivors of a woman who died
from toxic shock syndrome recovered $1,525,000 in actual damages and $10 million in punitive
damages. Id.
69. At the time of the award, punitive damages were not expressly taxable, nor excluded from
taxation, as "any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or
periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or sickness." 26 U.S.C. § 104 (a) (2) (1988).
70. O'Gilvie, 117 S. Ct. at 457.
71. Id.
72. Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer said that "[punitive] damages are not a substitute for
any normally untaxed personal (or financial) quality, good, or 'asset.' They do not compensate for
any kind of loss." Id. at 456.
73. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1 (1991). The Haslip case gave the
Supreme Court the opportunity to review an individual punitive damage award as a violation of due
process. Two years earlier, in Browning-FerrisInd. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257 (1989), the Court reviewed a punitive damage award for a potential violation of the Eighth
Amendment Excessive Fines Clause. Id. at 263-64. The Court did not address a challenge under
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the issue had not been raised in the
lower courts. Id. at 276. Each of the justices who wrote opinions in the Browning-Ferriscase
(Blackmun, Brennan, and O'Connor) expressed concerns about the due process implications of a
large punitive damage award. Brennan concurred "on the understanding that it leaves the door open
for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive damages in civil
cases brought by private parties." Id. at 280.
74. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 5-6. A minor issue in the case was whether the insurance company,
as a corporation, could be held liable for punitive damages for the acts of its agent. Id. at 13-14.
Applying traditional principles of agency law, the Court answered in the affirmative. Id. at 14. The
Court also rejected a related argument that imposing exemplary damages on a corporation for the
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damages.75 The Court upheld the award of punitive damages, saying that a
balance was achieved between the defendant's interest in rational decision
making and the State of Alabama's interest in deterrence and retribution which
was individually tailored.76 In upholding the award, the Court noted the
procedural safeguards, such as the post-trial review authority given to the
judge,7 and the appellate review available. 7" The Haslip decision constituted
a plaintiffs victory because the Court rejected the argument that punitive
damage awards are per se unconstitutional.' The real issue in Haslip was the
specific manner in which the jury was instructed to award punitive damages.
The majority and dissenting opinions differed over how much discretion juries
may be granted before due process is denied.'
But, the majority held out the
possibility that an award could be excessive in violation of the Due Process

acts of its agent violated due process. Id. at 14-15.
75. Id. at 5-6. The city clerk paid insurance premiums on behalf of the plaintiff, Ms. Haslip,
payments which were never credited to Ms. Haslip's insurance policy. Id. at 5. When the policy
went unpaid, the agent who misappropriated the premiums failed to forward the overdue notices to
Ms. Haslip. Id. Ms. Haslip became ill and needed hospital treatment. Id. The hospital requested
payment and sought to collect from Ms. Haslip, which adversely affected her credit. Id. Her outof-pocket expenses were $4000; total compensatory damages were $200,000. Id. at 6 & n.2.
76. Id. at 19-20. These interests, according to the Court, were reflected in the instructions
given to the jury. Id. at 20.
77. Id. The post-trial review comes in the forms of remittitur and addittitur. See SCHLUETER
& REDDEN, supra note 38, § 6.2. Remittitur literally calls for the plaintiff to "remit" a portion of
the damages back to the defendant, depending upon the amount the court deems excessive. Id.
Otherwise, the court will order a new trial on the issue of damages, with instructions as to the
limitations. Id. See ALA. CODE § 12-22-71 (1995) (on appeal of a damage award as excessive,
court has power of remittitur). Addittitur is the power of the court to add to the judgment, or call
for a new trial in the alternative. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 36, § 6.2. This power is not
available in federal cases. 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2816 (2d ed. 1995).
78. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 20-21. Justices Scalia and Kennedy, writing individual concurring
opinions, both referred to the long-standing tradition of punitive damages. See id. at 24-42. Justice
Scalia wrote that "a process that accords with such a tradition and does not violate the Bill of Rights
necessarily constitutes 'due' process." Id. at 25. Justice Kennedy concurred that "[j]ury
determination of punitive damages has such long and principled recognition as a central part of our
system that no further evidence of its essential fairness or rationality ought to be deemed necessary."
Id. at 40.
79. Id. at 17. The common law method for assessing punitive damages does not itself constitute
a per se violation of due process. Id. In fact, even Justice O'Connor would not go as far as
announcing that awarding punitive damages is per se unconstitutional, although she suggested that
the Court "permit the States to experiment with different methods and to adjust these methods over
time." Id. at 64.
80. Justice O'Connor ridiculed "amorphous" jury instructions which merely "restate the
overarching principles of punitive damages awards-to punish and deter-without adding meaning
to these terms." Id. at 48.
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However, the Court agreed upon no

In TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., a defendant in a
slander of title case raised due process challenges to a punitive damage award,
arguing that the award was excessive and produced by an unfair procedure.'
The Supreme Court in TXO addressed whether the punitive damage award that
the defendant claimed was not based on objective criteria could withstand a
challenge that it violated due process.'
The defendant contended that the
punitive damage award should be reviewed pursuant to the rational basis
standard applied in reviewing legislation, while the plaintiff argued that the
punitive damage award should be scrutinized more strictly than legislative
penalties.'" The majority rejected both arguments and suggested that a punitive
damage award made in the course of fair procedure with judicial review was
entitled to a presumption of validity. 5 The Court, consistent with Haslip,
refused to set down a "bright line test" to determine the point at which a
punitive damage award became constitutionally unacceptable.'
Again, the

81. Id. at 18-19. In speaking about the "extreme results that might jar one's constitutional
sensibilities," the Court apparently rejected ratios by stating that it cannot "draw a mathematical
bright line between the constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would
fit every case." Id. at 18. The Haslip decision upheld a punitive to compensatory damages ratio
of 210 to 1 ($4000 out of pocket loss compared with $840,000 punitive damages) or 4 to 1
($200,000 compensatory damages compared with $840,000 punitive damages). See id. at 23. Or,
as the majority approached the issue, it addressed whether the result could be squared with the
process and the factors of the case. See id. at 18. Haslip does not announce factors for
excessiveness. Haslip only states that excessive judgments may exist. See id. at 18-19.
82. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). Both issues were raised by the defendant, who had been found liable
for common law slander of title in a West Virginia state court. Id. at 446-47.
83. Id. at 453-55. TXO and Alliance had an agreement for TXO to obtain oil and gas
development rights. Id. at 447. Although it knew that Alliance had good title to the land, TXO
brought a quiet title action in order to renegotiate the royalty arrangement. Id. at 448-49. The West
Virginia Supreme Court reviewed the award and affirmed it because the court found that a
reasonable relationship existed between the award amount and (I) the potential harm to Alliance; (2)
the malice on the part of TXO; and (3) the penalty necessary to discourage TXO from acting in a
similar way in the future. Id. at 452-53.
84. Id. at 455. The plaintiff argued that a heightened scrutiny should be applied and that
objective criteria should be utilized to determine whether the notion of "fundamental fairness" had
been violated. Id.
85. Id. at 456-57.
86. Id. at 458. The damage award in this case, $10 million, equaled 526 times the
compensatory damages suffered by Alliance. The compensatory award resulted from the costs of
defending the quiet title action brought in bad faith by TXO. Id. at 451. The Court ignored the
numbers, however, noting:
The punitive damages award in this case is certainly large, but in light of the amount
of money potentially at stake, the bad faith of petitioner, the fact that the scheme
employed in this case was part of a larger pattern of fraud, trickery and deceit, and
petitioner's wealth, we are not persuaded that the award was so "grossly excessive" as
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Court resisted analyzing the amount of the punitive damage award, or the ratio
of punitive damages to compensatory damages as a specific yardstick to measure
a violation of due process.87 In fact, after TXO, there still existed no standards
for courts to deal with an individual award or the manner by which that award
was determined.
BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore"8 finally allowed the Court to
determine the standard by which to judge the process of awarding punitive
damages.89 BMW concerned an award of punitive damages against an
automobile manufacturer which had not disclosed to a purchaser that his car had
been repainted.'
In arguing for punitive damages, the plaintiffs attorney
urged the jury to award damages according to the total number of cars that had
been sold in the United States under BMW's alleged policy of non-disclosure.91
According to the Court, the award was "grossly excessive," thus violating
substantive due process.'
The case marked the first instance of the Court
overturning a punitive damage award based on the Fourteenth Amendment.'

to be beyond the power of the State to allow.
Id. at 462.
87. The ratio of punitive damages to compensatory damages in TXO (526 to 1) dwarfed the
amount in Haslip (200 to 1), causing Justice Scalia to remark: "The plurality's decision is valuable,
then, in that the great majority of due process challenges to punitive damages awards can henceforth
be disposed of simply with the observation that 'this is no worse than TXO.'" Id. at 472. Justice
Scalia's point is that, in reviewing punitive damage awards, procedural due process, and not
substantive due process, should concern the Court. Substantive due process, as applied to punitive
damages, implies that there is some amount at which a punitive damage award becomes
unconstitutional; procedural due process is concerned with the method of awarding the damages.
Because traditional judicial review of the damages exists, at the trial level and on appeal, due process
(procedural) is satisfied. Thus, the evident frustration in Scalia's comment is that he sees the Court
continuing to search for the elusive "bright line" test rejected in Haslip. Id. at 470-72.
88. 116 S. Ct. 1589 (1996).
89. The Court granted certiorari to "illuminate" the standard with which to review punitive
damages awards. Id. at 1595.
90. A former BMW dealer testified that repainting the car devalued it 10%; on a purchase price
of $40,000, that amounted to $4000 in compensatory damages. Id. at 1593. The purchaser brought
the action under an Alabama fraud statute, claiming that failure to disclose that the car had been
repainted amounted to a suppression of material fact. Id.
91. A total of 983 cars were sold this way, a total number that led to the original $4 million
punitive damage award. Id. The trial judge denied the defendant's motion to set aside the verdict
and the award. Id. at 1594. The Alabama Supreme Court, applying factors enunciated in Green
Oil Co. v. Hornsby, 539 So. 2d 218 (Ala. 1989), reduced the amount to $2 million. BMW of North
America, Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994). Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1594-95.
92. Id. at 1598. Although a state may further "legitimate interests in punishing unlawful
conduct and deterring its repetition," an award which is "grossly excessive" in comparison to those
interests begins to "enter the zone of arbitrariness" which violates due process. Id. at 1595.
93. Justice Scalia, writing in dissent, noted that no precedent existed for federalizing this
particular aspect of tort law. Gore, 116 S. Ct. at 1610-11. Also dissenting, Justice Ginsburg
referred to reforms already underway in many states, characterizing the decision as an unwise
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Furthermore, the case established three factors to be used in analyzing an
award of punitive damages.' First, the defendant's degree of reprehensibility
should be examined." In BMW, the Court found no particularly aggravating
factors usually associated with punitive damages;' the harm inflicted by BMW
on the automobile purchaser was strictly economic.'
Second, punitive
damages should bear a "reasonable relationship" to compensatory damages.9 s
A punitive damage award of $4 million, compared to actual damages of $4000,
qualified as "breathtaking" in the Court's opinion." Finally, the punitive
damage award must be compared with civil or criminal sanctions for comparable

misconduct. 1t

In this case, the maximum fine the Court mentioned for

similar conduct was a $10,000 penalty for deceptive trade practices in
Arkansas. 101
In fact, Supreme Court opinions have likened punitive damages more to
fines or penalties imposed on defendants, than to extra compensation for
plaintiffs. 2 Along with challenging punitive damage awards as a violation
of due process, a defendant in an antitrust action challenged a punitive damage
award as an excessive fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment in BrowningFerris Industries of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc."13 The defendants
argued that an award of punitive damages should be subject to the Excessive
Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment because the Clause has its roots in
limiting amercements0 4 payable to the crown.I"
The Court rejected this

venture "into territory traditionally within the States' domain." Id. at 1614.
94. Id. at 1598-99.
95. Id. at 1599.
96. Id. at 1599, 1601. The Court determined that BMW's conduct was "not sufficiently
reprehensible to warrant imposition of a $2 million exemplary damages award." Id. at 1601.
97. Id. at 1599.
98. Id. at 1602. The Court's reasoning is troublesome, especially when it relies on the TXO
decision for support of this proposition. Id. at 1602 n.34. Damages which Alliance would have
suffered in TXO were speculative. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. at 451.
Actual damages were the $19,000 expended on legal fees defending the quiet title action. Id. Of
course, at issue in TXO was the method of awarding damages, and one of the factors used by the
West Virginia court was potential harm. Id. at 453.
99. BMW, 116 S. Ct. at 1603.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 1603 n.40. The maximum penalty in Alabama for deceptive trade practices was
$2000. Id. at 1603.
102. See, e.g., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 454 (1993)
(citing cases imposing limits on "penalties"); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal,
Inc., 492 U.S. 257,259 (1989) (holding that punitive damages are not subject to the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment).
103. 492 U.S. 257 (1989).
104. "A pecuniary penalty imposed by a judicial tribunal." 1 BoUvIER'S LAW DIctIONARY
187 (8th ed. 1914). "A money penalty in the nature of a fine imposed upon an officer for some
misconduct or neglect of duty." BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 75 (5th ed. 1979). Amercements are
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argument, noting the long history of the Excessive Fines Clause as suggesting
that its limits are confined to criminal prosecutions, or cases in which the state
has some active prosecutorial role. " However, the Court held out the
possibility that the Excessive Fines Clause could apply to a situation in which
the state assessed the punitive damage award or took a share of the
proceeds. " Although the Court demonstrated in 1996 that an individual
award can be grossly excessive, tort reformers could not count on the Court to
place substantive restrictions on juries."08 And so, tort reform moved to the
battlefield of the legislature.
III.

REFORMING PUNITIVE DAMAGES

A. Reform Efforts at the National Level
Although punitive damages in state tort actions are imposed pursuant to
state statutory or common law, recent tort reform proposals at the national level
have considered pre-empting state tort law."0 Major efforts to reform the way
punitive damages are awarded began after then-Vice President Dan Quayle's
Council on Competitiveness issued a fifty-point proposal on tort reform.110
Among the proposals was a cap on punitive damages."' Aligning against
reform efforts were the American Trial Lawyers' Association and consumer
groups, like Public Citizen, who charged the White House with pandering to

traced from the Magna Carta to the ratification of the Excessive Fines Clause in Andrew M.
Kenefick, Note, The Constitutionalityof PunitiveDamages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the
Eighth Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1714-19 (1987).
105. 492 U.S. at 268-69. See also Kenefick, supra note 104, at 1701 (challenging the
conventional wisdom that the Eighth Amendment applies only in criminal cases on the basis that
punitive damages blur the criminal/civil distinction).
106. 492 U.S. at 263-64.
107. Id.
108. See Rustad, supranote 6, at 724-28 (reviewing the history concerning various tort reform
movements).
109. Id. at 674.
110. PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUsTICE REFORM IN

AMERICA (Aug. 1991). The Council suggested increasing the frequency of alternative dispute
resolution, reforming discovery practices and the use of expert witnesses, and implementing a
modified "English Rule" for awarding attorney's fees. Id. Quayle presented the highlights from
the proposal to the 1991 annual meeting of the American Bar Association. See Dan Quayle, Civil
Justice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 559 (1992).
111. The Agenda proposed increasing the standard of proof to require intent; a bifurcated
proceeding in which, after the jury determined that punitive damages were necessary, punitive
damages would be determined by the court; a clear and convincing evidentiary standard to support
the award; and limiting the punitive award to amounts equal to compensatory damages. Quayle,
supra note 110, at 565.
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business interests in the formulation of the proposal."' The ABA soon called
for cooperation with the Administration's efforts.113 Despite the efforts of the
Vice President and others, attempts
to reform the tort system at the national
14
level have been unsuccessful.
In May 1996, President Clinton vetoed a bill that would have capped
punitive damages at the greater of two times the economic loss to the plaintiff
or $250,000."' The bill also called for a "clear and convincing" standard of
proof that the defendant's conduct was carried out "with a conscious, flagrant
indifference to the rights or safety of others."1 6 Exceptions were carved out
for cases of "egregious" conduct and allowed courts to determine that the
defendant's conduct required an award above the statutory cap." 7 Finally, the
bill would have allowed states to enact tougher tort reform." 8 The National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Law recently drafted a "Model
Punitive Damages Act" which contains no cap on the amount of punitive
damages, but instead instructs the jury to award punitive damages based on a
number of factors, including the nature of the defendant's conduct, how the
conduct affected others, whether the defendant profited from the behavior, the
amount of compensatory damages awarded, and the defendant's wealth." 9
B. State Tort Reform
1. Placing Caps on Attorney's Fees
While most plaintiffs see the inside of the courtroom only once, the
attorneys who bring the lawsuits return again and again. Not surprisingly,
several tort reform proposals in recent years have included provisions aimed at

112. See Andrew Blum, Quayle's ProposalsStill Making Waves, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 1991,
at 3.
113. See Andrew Blum, Upset Staffers: ABA Takes Softer Stand on Quayle, NAT'L L.J., Oct.
14, 1991, at 3.
114. See Rustad, supra note 6. After the 1996 elections, tort reform once again headed the list
of congressional priorities. Torry, supra note 19, at F7.
115. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. (1996). See also Marshall S. Turner & Andrew T. Houghton,
Punitive Damages Reform Moves to the State Arena, NAT'L L.J., July 29, 1996, at B7. President
Clinton specifically cited his opposition to "arbitrary ceilings on punitive damages, because they
endanger the safety of the public. Capping punitive damages undermines their very purpose, which
is to punish and thereby deter egregious misconduct." Message of the Presidentof the United States
(May 6, 1996), in COLLECTED PAPERS OF WILLIAM JEFFERSON CLINTON.
116. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(a) (1996).
117. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(b)(3) (1996).
118. H.R. 956, 104th Cong. § 108(b)(3)(D) (1996).
119. MODEL PUNMVE DAMAGES AC (Tentative Draft 1996). See Marcia Coyle, ModelAct
Would ighten Punies, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 5, 1996, at A12.
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curbing attorney's desires to bring suit by limiting contingent fee contracts.' 20
An attorney working for a "contingent" fee is compensated by a portion of the
On the other hand, for an attorney working "hourly"
successful recovery.'
or "on retainer," a certain amount of money has been deposited as a "down
payment" to secure services without regard to the outcome of a lawsuit, and the
client is billed for each hour of service with the billed amount paid from the
retainer. 2 2 A contingent fee contract, stipulating that a percentage of the total
recovery will be paid as compensation for services, motivates the attorney to
push for higher damages. The higher the damage award, the higher the fee.
Contingency contracts are defended on the grounds that they make litigation
affordable for those who might be unable to post a large retainer up front.
Contingent fee contracts are not allowed in actions where they are found
void as against public policy.' 23 Although the only limit on the percentage of
the judgment that an attorney may charge is the "reasonableness" standard

mentioned by most state professional responsibility codes, most states agree that
fifty percent of the total judgment would be excessive or unreasonable. 2 4 In
some actions, the percentage an attorney can charge is limited by statute."n

120. See Richard M. Birnholz, Note, The Validity and Propriety of Contingent Fee Controls,
37 UCLA L. REV. 949 (1990) (discussing the constitutionality of reform efforts in California and
other states, arguing that attempts to limit contingency fee contracts may be unconstitutional for
various reasons, including substantive due process and equal protection concerns, as well as access
to courts and attorneys' free speech rights).
121. 1 STUART M. SPEISER, ATTORNEY FEES § 2:1 (1973 & 1994 Supp.).
122. Id.§ 1:4.
123. Id.§§ 2:4-2:8 (listing domestic relations, actions to secure legislation, contracts to
prosecute or defend in criminal actions, and representing a trustee in a bankruptcy matter as
traditionally held void as against public policy). Most state Rules of Professional Conduct also
specifically prohibit contingency contracts in these areas. See, e.g., IND. R. PROF. CONDUCT §
1.5(d).
124. SPEISER, supra note 121, § 2:10.
125. Attorneys fees are specifically limited by statute in many federal causes of action. See
Annotation, Effect of Contingent Fee Contract on Fee Award Authorized by Federal Statute, 76 ALR
Fed. 347 (1986 & Supp. 1996). Many states limit the percentage an attorney may recover from
state-administered funds,-such as medical malpractice funds. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1818-1 (West Supp. 1998) (attorneys limited to 15% of any recovery from the patients' compensation
fund).
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Generally, each party to the litigation must pay for his own attorney, and
clients may shop around for the best bargain.12 6 When the court awards
attorney's fees to the victorious party, the amount awarded is the "lodestar," an
27
amount equal to a reasonable rate times a reasonable number of hours.1
When an attorney is working on contingency, this amount is more difficult to
determine. In City of Burlington v. Dague,'21 the U.S. Supreme Court
rejected the argument that a lodestar fee must take into account the risk of
failure which means no recovery for the attorney working on contingency. In
Dague, the Court held that enhancement of the lodestar was not available to an
attorney working under a contingent fee contract to compensate for the risk of
non-recovery. 2 9 However, the awarding of attorney's fees to the victorious
party remains rare, generally limited to contract disputes and actions where fees
are awarded pursuant to statute.110

126. Plaintiffs often have no choice but to offer a contingent fee to an attorney. This reality
often leads to the "no fee unless you collect" type of advertising. See Kathleen E. Payne, Linking
Tort Reform to Fairness and Moral Values, 1995 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 1207, 1233
(arguing that tort reformers receive support from a public that believes the television commercials
which preach that any injury is compensable and that "the litigation explosion is causing all of the
country's economic problems").
127. A lodestar is a "guiding principle." THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE
ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1076 (3d ed. 1992).

128. 505 U.S. 557 (1992).
129. For criticism of Dague, see Charles Silver, Incoherence and Irrationalityin the Law of
Attorneys' Fees, 12 REV. LrnG. 301 (1993). Silver reviews the Dague decision and the Supreme
Court decision in Kay v. Ehrler, 499 U.S. 432 (1991), noting that the opinions of the justices
regarding the fee awards may have been influenced by the justices' attitudes toward the substantive
cause of action:
In the federal courts, statutes authorize judges to grant fee awards mainly when
plaintiffs win public interest cases that are thought to confer substantial external benefits
on society at large. These laws are politically controversial and certain Justices who
object to them may be deciding fee award cases in ways calculated to discourage their
enforcement.
Id. at 304-05. For a discussion of the role of risk in the contingent fee contract, see SPEISER, supra
note 121, § 8:10, at 319-20. See also Lester Brickman, Contingency Fees Without Contingencies:
Hamlet Without the Princeof Denmark?, 37 UCLA L. REV. 29 (1989). Professor Brickman argues
against contingent fee contracts in cases where there is no contingency, or no risk of non-recovery.
Id. at 33. Such cases result in overcompensation for the attorney. Id. at 35.
130. SPEISER, supranote 121, § 13:1. The "American Rule," by which each party is expected
to pay their own attorney's fees, remains quite firmly entrenched. For a discussion of why punitive
damages do not encompass attorney's fees, see Comment, CriticalReappraisalof PunitiveDamages
Encompassing Attorneys' Fees: Normative Analysis and PragmaticConcerns, 42 BAYLOR L. REV.
737 (1990).
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Several states have attempted to reform the contingency fee contract.'
California voters recently rejected a ballot initiative that would have capped
contingency fees in early settlements.' 32 Proponents say that contingency
contracts discourage settlement because of the built in incentive for the plaintiff's
attorney to go to trial, especially in cases that seem to offer sure victory. To
prevent instances where the plaintiff's attorney might refuse to settle with a
willing defendant, several states have attempted to enact statutes that penalize
133
this refusal to settle.
A proposal by the think tank Manhattan Institute called for enforcing
existing ethical bars against "unreasonable" fees as a way of limiting
contingency fees."' 4 Citing examples of settlements producing astronomical
fees for plaintiffs' attorneys working on contingency, the group formulated an
elaborate method of calculating exactly when a fee becomes unreasonable and,
13
therefore, contrary to existing state bars on unreasonable fee arrangements.
However, the plaintiffs' bar and others have attacked the proposal, and efforts
in most states to limit contingency contracts have been rejected, as in

California.
2.

136

Allocating Punitive Damages to the State

137
An increasing number of states are implementing reform measures.
One recent trend in state tort reform efforts is to direct a portion of the punitive
damage awards away from plaintiffs. 38 Supporters of this type of reform
point out that punitive damages are not meant to compensate tort victims, who

131. Birnholz, supra note 120, at 950. Such efforts have been challenged on constitutional
grounds, although lawyers, as officers of the court, may be subject to broader regulations imposed
by courts and legislatures. Id. at 959.
132. Victoria Slind-Flor, Tort Revision "Lost Cause" in California? Voters Reject Capped
Fees, No-Fault and Loser Pays, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 8, 1996, at Bl. Proposition 202 would have
capped contingent fees in the case of an early settlement at 15%. Id.
133. Indiana's House Enrolled Act 1741 contained a failure to settle provision that would apply
when the final judgment is less favorable to the party refusing to settle: "If a recipient does not
accept a qualified settlement offer and the final judgment is less favorable to the recipient than the
terms of the qualified settlement offer, the court shall award attorney's fees, costs and expenses to
the offeror upon the offeror's motion." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-50-1-6(a) (West Supp. 1998). The
amount of fees, costs, and expenses may not exceed $1000. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-50-1-6(b) (West
Supp. 1998).
134. LESTER BRICKMAN Er AL., RETHINKING CONTINGENCY FEES 15-16 (1994).
135. Id. at 22-23. See also Michael Horowitz, Making Ethics Real, Making Ethics Work: A
Proposalfor Contingency Fee Reform, 44 EMORY L.J. 173, appendix (1995).
136. See Horowitz, supra note 135, at 182-92; Peter Passell, Windfall Fees in Injury Cases
Under Assault, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 11, 1994, at Al.
137. See McKown, supra note 17 (surveying state legislative and judicial activity).
138. Id. at 436. See also Owen, supra note 2, at 410. For a constitutional analysis of "splitrecovery" statutes, see Klaben, supra note 23.
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are otherwise made whole through compensatory damage awards.13 9 Instead,
they argue, punitive damages amount to windfalls for plaintiffs."'
By
directing punitive damage awards away from plaintiffs and into stateadministered funds, the deterrent effect of punitive damages remains intact
without plaintiffs receiving undeserved windfalls."4
Nine states have enacted statutes that allocate a portion of any punitive
damage award to the state. 42
1
These states have legislatively determined that
plaintiffs in tort actions should not receive "windfalls" by being awarded
punitive damages.143 Because punitive damages are essentially civil fines,
these reformers argue that the proper beneficiaries of such penalties are the
states.'"4 In Kansas, a similar statute that applies to medical malpractice
claims allocates fifty percent of any punitive damage award to the state
treasury.' 45 In some instances, the awards are designated to achieve some

139. For the theoretical arguments in favor of such a scheme, see Sloane, supra note 7, at 490.
For a rebuttal against such arguments, see Owen, supra note 2, at 410.
140. See Economic Analysis, supra note 8, at 1903-11. This article analyzes punitive damages
from an economic efficiency model, concluding that punitive damages windfalls "provide inefficient
compensation, encourage risk-seeking behavior, and misallocate legal resources." Id. at 1907. For
a counterpoint to the idea that plaintiffs actually "seek" risk in order to receive punitive damage
awards, see Rustad, supra note 6, at 720. Professor Rustad notes that "[t]ort reform uses corporate
executives as poster children, creating the appearance that unworthy plaintiffs harass 'deep-pocket'
corporations by filing frivolous lawsuits," and that reform advocates employ "the basic strategy of
'blaming the victim' to attack injured plaintiffs and their lawyers." Id. at 720-21.
141. Sloane, supra note 7, at 490.
142. See supra note 21.
143. Sloane, supra note 7, at 490; Grube, supra note 7, at 850-52. In 1996, the Alabama
Supreme Court allocated one half of a punitive damages award to the state in Lfe Ins. Co. of Ga.
v. Johnson, 684 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1996). Justice Shores, also the author of an article advocating the
allocation of punitive damages to the state (see Shores, supra note 7), writing the opinion, awarded
the plaintiff half of a $12.5 million punitive damages award, and awarded the other half to the state
general fund. Id. at 698. Before splitting the award between the state and the plaintiff, the court
announced that the costs of the litigation and reasonable attorney's fees were to be awarded from
the punitive damage award. Id. at 699. Justice Shores noted the risk of failure which is placed on
the attorney who takes such cases for plaintiffs. Id. at 693. In dissent, Justice Maddox criticized
the decision, arguing that such a determination should be left to the Alabama legislature. Id. at 704.
Mirroring arguments made against the statutes which have been enacted, Justice Maddox argued that
the decision usurped legislative power to enact revenue raising legislation. Id. at 707-08. In
addition, the allocation, according to Justice Maddox, may implicate the Excessive Fines Clause.
Id. at 708-09. Finally, Justice Maddox argued that the decision may be subject to the Double
Jeopardy Clause. Id. at 710. Similar arguments have been addressed in Sloane, supra note 7.
The Texas Supreme Court suggested to its legislature that it "enact a law apportioning one-half
of punitive damage awards to the State" in General Resources Org., Inc. v. Deadman, 932 S.W.2d
485, 486 (Tex. 1996). The decision expresses the generally accepted notion that punitive damage
awards are not meant as compensation, lists the states with such statutes, and notes the challenges
which have been made. Id. at 486.
144. See Shores, supra note 7, at 91; Sloane, supra note 7, at 505.
145. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402(e) (1996).
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perceived social good; other statutes merely deposit awards into the state
treasuries. 46 The amount of the award that the state takes varies, ranging
from fifty to seventy-five percent in some states to an amount to be determined
141
by the court in other states.

Plaintiffs have challenged such statutes on several grounds. 14 1 First,
plaintiffs have argued that such statutes effect a taking of a vested property
interest in the judgment. 49 Typically, these statutes, which allocate a portion
of the award to the state, are challenged as improper state revenue generating
devices or improper "user fees" that exact a "price on judgment."150 Second,
the statutes have also been challenged as impairing access to the courts,
especially for plaintiffs who cannot afford attorney's fees and pay on a
contingency basis.''
Finally, these schemes have been challenged as

146. In Florida, when a case awarding punitive damages involves personal injury or death, the
portion payable to the state goes to a Public Medical Assistance Fund. FLA. STAT. ANN. §
768.73(2)(b) (West 1997). In Georgia, the amount is paid to the Office of the Treasury and Fiscal
Services. GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1997). The Illinois statute provides that, at the
discretion of the court, a portion may be allocated to the Department of Human Services. 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 1997). Indiana deposits a portion of the award into the
Violent Crime Victims Fund. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6(b)(2) (West Supp. 1998). In Iowa, the
state's share goes to a Civil Reparations Trust Fund. IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.l(2)(b) (West
1987). Missouri deposits its portion into the Tort Victims' Compensation Fund. Mo. STAT. ANN.
§ 537.675 (Supp. 1997). In Oregon, funds are placed into a Criminal Injuries Compensation
Account. OR. REv. STAT. § 18.540 (1995). And in Utah, the amount awarded to the state goes
in to the state's general fund. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (Michie 1996).
147. In Florida, 65% of the award goes to the plaintiff and 35% to the state. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.73 (West Supp. 1997). Georgia, Indiana, and Iowa split the award as follows: 75% to the
state and 25% to the plaintiff, except that Iowa allows the entire amount to go to the plaintiff in
cases where the behavior leading to the award was specifically aimed at the plaintiff. GA. CODE
ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1997); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (West Supp. 1998); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668A. 1(2)(b) (West 1987). The issue of specifically directed tortious behavior has been
litigated in Iowa. See Fernandez v. Curley, 463 N.W.2d 5 (Iowa 1990) (negligent behavior of drunk
driver not aimed specifically at plaintiff to justify no allocation). Oregon allocates 60% of the award
to the state and 40% to the plaintiff. OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1995). Missouri splits the award
equally between the state and the plaintiff. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.675 (West Supp. 1997). In
Utah, the plaintiff recovers the first $20,000 of any punitive damage award; then the state and the
plaintiff split the remainder evenly. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(3) (Michie 1996). Illinois grants
the court discretion to split the award. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 1996).
148. See generally Klaben, supra note 23.
149. See, e.g., Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991) (declaring Colorado
allocation statute unconstitutional). But see Shepherd Components, Inc. v. Brice Petrides-Donohue
& Assocs., 473 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1991) (finding no vested right to punitive damage award).
150. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992) (holding allocation statute not an
unconstitutional user fee).
151. See, e.g., State v. Moseley, 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993) (ruling that allocation statute does
not deny access to courts).
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impairing existing contracts. 152 Most challenges have failed, and several
commentators have conceded that statutes that allocate a portion of the punitive
damage award to the state will continue to be upheld. 153 Those cases that have
declared allocation schemes unconstitutional have been weakened by subsequent,
stronger rulings in other states that have distinguished and diluted any possible
precedential value. "
The first case to analyze a statute allocating a portion of the punitive
damage award to the state, McBride v. General Motors Corp.,'55 examined a
Georgia statute that allocated seventy-five percent of the punitive damage award
15 6
to the state and granted the state status as a non-party judgment creditor.
The federal district court in McBride held that the statute was unconstitutional
as a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
because it distinguished between plaintiffs in products liability actions who may
receive punitive damages and plaintiffs in all other actions who may receive
punitive damages.' 57
The court also held that the statute violated the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and the Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment, pointing out that the statute transformed
punitive damage awards into fines that benefit the state. 58 Suddenly, the new
paradigm for reviewing punitive damages awards was no longer the Due Process
Clause but the Excessive Fines Clause. 59 The McBride court described the

152. Gordon, 608 So. 2d at 802 (f'iding no impairment of existing fee contract where statute
existed before fee arrangement entered).
153. See Janet V. Hallahan, Social Interests Versus Paintifl'sRights: The ConstitutionalBattle
over Statutory Limitations on Punitive Damages, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 405, 434 (1995)
("underpinning each decision lies the courts' implicit recognition of the legislative power to
subordinate the traditional purposes of punitive damages to the social need to rein them in").
154. Id. at 427 (noting that "numerous decisions subsequent to McBride and Kirk undermine
the precedental value of these early decisions").
155. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
156. GA. STAT. ANN. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1996). Both the "single award" and the allocation
provisions in the Georgia statute were challenged. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1565. A "single
award" provision allows plaintiffs in a class action to recover only one punitive damage award
against a defendant. See McKown, supra note 17, at 459-61. Indiana does not allow multiple
punitive damages awards. Id. at 459 (citing Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322 (1854)). In January 1997,
Senator Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) introduced a bill into the U.S. Senate which would eliminate multiple
punitive damages awards. See Orrin Hatch, Statement on Introduction of the Multiple Punitive
Damages Fairness Act of 1997, 1997 WL 4428785, at *1.
157. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at 1569. Plaintiffs in McBride sought to have the Georgia tort
reform act declared unconstitutional as violative of the Equal Protection, Due Process, the right to
jury trial, the Excessive Fines Clauses, and the single subject law provision of the Georgia
constitution. Id. at 1567. The plaintiffs alleged that rear seat belts in General Motors vehicles were
defective. Id. at 1566.
158. Id. at 1578.
159. See Klaben, supra note 23, at 126-29 (reviewing the cases which have analyzed the "splitrecovery statutes" using the Excessive Fines Clause).
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statute as an arbitrary, unreasonable provision designed to take away any
incentive injured plaintiffs might have to bring suit to punish big businesses and
deter future misconduct. 160
The year following McBride, the Colorado Supreme Court in Kirk v.
Denver Publishing Co. 161struck down a similar statute, which allocated onethird of any punitive damage award to the state, as an unconstitutional taking of
the plaintiff's vested property right in the punitive damage award. 6 Because
the one-third allocation applied to all punitive damage awards, the Colorado
statute, unlike the statute in McBride, was not analyzed on equal protection
grounds. The court ruled that the statute constituted a taking of a vested
property right because the state's right to the award came about only as a result
of the plaintiff's effort and time." Thus, the court held that punitive damages
could be considered vested property in the judgment creditor (the plaintiff) after
the judgment was entered.' 64 The court was unable to find a reasonable
relationship between the government services utilized by the litigants and the
amount awarded to the state. 165
Kirk is the only state supreme court case to strike down a punitive damage
allocation statute."6 Subsequent courts in different states have found no vested
property right in a punitive damage award and therefore no "takings" problem.
In Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Conkle, 67 the Georgia Supreme Court reviewed the

160. McBride, 737 F. Supp. at1578.
161. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
162. The plaintiff in Kirk, a newspaper delivery contractor, sued the newspaper company for
malicious prosecution and received an award of $288,000 in compensatory damages and $160,500
in punitive damages, which was later reduced to $118,900 to equal actual damages. Id. at 264. The
plaintiff filed a post-trial motion to invalidate the Colorado allocation statute as unconstitutional. Id.
163. Id. at 266-67.
164. Id. at 268.
165. Id. at 270. An attorney who represented a plaintiff whose award was allocated to
Colorado in accordance with the then-valid statute attempted to file an attorney's lien on the amount
of the punitive damages allocated to the state in Schenck v. Minolta Office Sys., Inc., 873 P.2d 18
(Colo. Ct. App. 1993). The attorney had a contingency fee contract with his client and filed a lien
for the same fee on the $100,000 awarded to the state (50%). Id. Eight months after the attorney
filed his lien against the state, the Colorado Supreme Court announced the Kirk decision, and the
attorney moved to foreclose on the lien. Id. The trial court held that the validity of the lien
depended upon whether the attorney's client had any right to the amount of the award payable to the
state. Id. The court also determined that the attorney had been reasonably compensated by the fee
agreement with the plaintiff. Id. at 19.
On appeal, the attorney raised two issues: first, the attorney claimed that he was entitled to
fees based on the "equitable fund" doctrine; second, the attorney claimed an ownership interest in
the award, much like the attorney had in Kirk. Id. The court rejected both arguments.
166. The Supreme Court denied the petition for certiorari for State v. Moseley, 114 S. Ct. 2101
(1994).
167. 436 S.E.2d 635 (Ga. 1993).
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same statute declared unconstitutional in McBride three years earlier." The
Conkle court held that the allocation of punitive damages to the state did not
violate state or federal equal protection guarantees.169 The court announced
that no right to an award of punitive damages exists under Georgia state
law. 70 A companion case, State v. Mosely,' held that the statute did not
effect a takings violation.72 Because the plaintiff has no right to an award of
punitive damages, the state need only advance a rational argument to limit the
awarding of punitive damages. 7 3
a.

Allocation Statutes and Attorney's Fees

For the purpose of this Note, the importance of these state statutory
schemes lies in the provisions that mention attorney's fees. In Georgia, seventyfive percent of a punitive damage award is allocated to the state, but not before
a proportionate amount of the litigation costs, including attorney's fees, are first
paid to the plaintiff." 4 Similarly, Iowa provides that costs and attorney's fees
will be paid for the plaintiff before seventy-five percent of the award is allocated
to the state. 75 In Missouri, after payment of expenses and counsel fees, fifty
percent of the punitive damage award is given to the Tort Victims'
Compensation Fund.' 76 Illinois law allows courts to determine the exact
allocation of the punitive damage award between the plaintiff, the plaintiff's
attorney, and the Illinois Department of Human Services.' 7

168. 737 F. Supp. 1563 (M.D. Ga. 1990).
169. 436 S.E.2d at 639. A tractor-trailer accident occurred as the result of a crack in the right
frame rail. Id. at 636. The plaintiff in Conkle sued the truck manufacturer on a theory of strict
liability and for a negligent failure to recall or warn. Id. The plaintiff's damage award was reduced
by 15% for comparative negligence. Id. Compensatory damages were over $180,000; punitive
damages equaled $2 million. Id. at 637.
170. Id. at 639.
171. 436 S.E.2d 632 (Ga. 1993).
172. Id. at 634.
173. See, e.g., Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800, 802 (Fla. 1992).
174. "Seventy-five percent of any amounts awarded under this section as punitive damages, less
a proportionate part of the costs of litigation, including reasonable attorney's fees, all as determined
by the trial judge, shall be paid into the treasury of the state." GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5. l(e)(2)
(Supp. 1996).
175. "[A]fter payment of all applicable costs and fees, an amount not to exceed twenty-five
percent of the punitive or exemplary damages awarded may be ordered paid to the claimant, with
the remainder of the award to be ordered paid into a civil reparations trust fund administered by the
state court administrator." IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.l(2)(b) (West 1987).
176. "Fifty percent of any final judgment awarding punitive damages after the deduction of
attorney's fees and expenses shall be deemed rendered in favor of the state of Missouri." MO. REv.
STAT. § 537.675(2) (Supp. 1997).
177. "The trial court may also, in its discretion, apportion the punitive damage award among
the plaintiff, the plaintiff's attorney and the State of Illinois Department of Human Services." 735
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 1996).
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Allocation statutes in other states are silent as to the payment of counsel for
winning a punitive damage award." 8
While Kirk v. Denver Publishing
Co." mentioned the effort that the plaintiff expends in obtaining a punitive
damage award as part of the reason for finding a property interest in that award,
the court did not reach the issue of whether the statute operated as an
The Florida
impairment of the attorney-client contingency contract."W
Supreme Court in Gordon v. State' found no impairment of an existing
contract."" However, the statute at issue in Gordon explicitly forbade an
existing contingency contract to include the amount of any punitive damage
award going to the state."8 3 Because the implicit purposes behind such statutes
is to reduce litigation, a rational interpretation of such statutes would not provide
an award of attorney's fees in the portion allocated to the state.
b.

Allocation Statutes and State Involvement

The process by which the state collects its portion of an award and the
proper role of the state in the collection and appeal of an award has been
litigated in several states. In Finley v. Empiregas Inc. ,"'5 the State of Missouri
moved to have a district court disburse a portion of a punitive damage award
owed to the state under a statute that awarded a percentage of any punitive

178. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(1)(b) (1995): "Sixty percent shall be paid to the
Criminal Injuries Compensation Account." Oregon further limits the attorney's compensation on
the amount of punitive damages awarded to the plaintiff: "Forty percent shall be paid to the
prevailing party. The attorney for the prevailing party shall be paid out of the amount allocated
under this paragraph, in the amount agreed upon between the attorney and the prevailing party.
However, in no event may more than 20 percent of the amount awarded as punitive damages be paid
to the attorney for the prevailing party." OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540(l)(a) (1995).
179. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
180. Id. at 265.
181. 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
182. Id. at 802.
183. The Florida statute was amended to read:
Claimant's attorney's fees, if payable from the judgment, are, to the extent that
they are based on the punitive damages, calculated based on the portion of the judgment
payable to the claimant as provided in sub-section (2). Nothing herein limits the
payment of attorney's fees based on the award of damages other than punitive damages.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (7) (West Supp. 1997).
184. But see Grube, supra note 7, at 856 (arguing that, under such a statute, the state should
pay the plaintiffs attorney).
185. 28 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1994). In Finley, the plaintiff had sued alleging gender
discrimination under both federal and state law. Id. at 783. The court awarded the plaintiff $4250
in actual and $125,000 in punitive damages. Id. The defendant counter-claimed fraud and
conversion and was awarded $401 in compensatory and $20,000 in punitive damages. Id. Only the
award to the plaintiff was appealed. Id.
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damage award to the state. s"
The court declined to address the
constitutionality of the statute."S The case raised the question, however, of
how a state enforces its claim to the portion of the punitive damage award. The
court held that the state could not intervene in the action to collect the punitive
damage award and left it to the legislature to determine how the state could
collect an award in an action where the state was not a party until the awarding
of punitive damages." A Florida appeals court reached a somewhat opposite
89
conclusion in Sontag v. State Department of Banking and Finance'
holding
that the state was entitled to recover its sixty percent of a punitive damage award
where parties settled after the verdict but before satisfaction of judgment."9
The court agreed that the settlement agreement and satisfaction of judgment
.were a subterfuge to dispossess the Department of its portion of the award of
punitive damages."9'
Tort reformers have been much more successful in the state legislatures,
enacting limitations on compensatory and punitive damages and, in some cases,
enacting limits on attorneys' fees."9 A recent trend in tort reform, allocating
by statute a percentage of the punitive damage award away from the plaintiff and
to the state, transforms the punitive damage award from a "windfall" for the
plaintiff into a penalty or fine imposed by the state.191 Most state allocation

186. According to the Missouri statute:
(2) Fifty percent of any final judgment.., shall be deemed rendered in favor of
the state of Missouri. The circuit clerks shall notify the attorney general of any final
judgment awarding punitive damages rendered in their circuits. With respect to such
fifty percent, the attorney general shall collect upon such judgment, and may execute
or make settlements with respect thereto as he deems appropriate for deposit into the
fund.
(3) The state of Missouri shall have no interest in or right to intervene at any stage
of any judicial proceeding under this section.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 537.675 (Supp. 1997).
187. The court noted: "Although several states in addition to Missouri have enacted statutes
that award a portion of punitive damages to the state, the constitutional issues Finley raises have
received limited and desultory treatment in the courts." Finley, 28 F.3d at 784.
188. Id. at 785.
189. 669 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
190. Id.
191. Id. at 284. Most allocation statutes allow for the state to intervene, or have been
interpreted to allow the state to intervene to collect its portion of the judgment. However, in Eulrich
v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 798 P.2d 715 (Or. Ct. App. 1990), the state of Oregon intervened to
collect its portion of the judgment pursuant to the state allocation statute. Id. at 716. Once the
defendant appealed the judgment, the issue before the court was whether the state had an interest in
the appeal such that its "claim" for its portion had to be adjudicated. Id. The court held that the
state did not have an interest in the underlying action until there existed a fund capable of
distribution. Id.
192. See supra notes 120-36 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 137-73 and accompanying text.
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statutes mention exactly how plaintiffs' attorneys are to receive compensation on
the amount allocated to the state.' Some allocation statutes address the state's
newfound involvement in the award by detailing the collection process. 1" The
next Section of this Note discusses the adoption of the Indiana statute, an
allocation statute that does not mention anything about awarding attorneys
compensation for arguing the case for punitive damages.
IV.

THE INDIANA PUNITIVE DAMAGES ALLOCATION STATUTE

A. Background of the Indiana Allocation Statute
When the Indiana General Assembly decided to take up tort reform,
limiting punitive damages quickly became the focal issue, and soon a bill was
drafted." The insurance and manufacturer's lobbies and the Indiana Chamber
of Commerce supported the bill; opposed were the Indiana Trial Lawyers'
Association, the AARP, and a consumer group called the Hoosier Alliance for
Consumer Rights." 9 Both sides aired television and radio advertisements in
an effort to conjure constituent support. 98 Indiana Governor Evan Bayh

194. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
196. Perhaps because dollars and limitations on the amount of recovery are easier to report and
easier to digest, many of the stories and editorials concerning HB 1741, as it moved through the
legislature, revolved around the punitive damage cap. Editorials spoke of the need to curb
"frivolous suits" and about the scourge of "contingency-fee attorneys, who, getting a percentage of
the take, have a direct interest in jacking up damages." Editorial, Lawsuit Explosion, EVANS.
COUR., Mar. 14, 1994, at A8.
Another reason the punitive damage provision received so much attention was that it was a
specifically raised concern of a key voting member of the Senate committee which considered the
bill. See Richard D. Walton, Tort Reform Bill Stalls in Senate Panel, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 4,
1995, at B4. State Senator John Waterman (R-Shelburn) expressed concern that the original
language of the punitive damage cap (limiting punitive damages at three times compensatory) would
not be adequate in cases where compensatory damages were low but punishment and deterrence
necessary. An amendment was added to address these concerns (allowing the greater of three times
compensatory or $50,000), and Waterman voted for the bill to leave committee. Eight days later,
HB 1741, complete with the amendment, passed on a largely party line vote, with one
Republican-Senator John Waterman-voting against the bill on the Senate floor. See Richard D.
Walton, Senate Passes Bill to Limit Punitive Damages in Lawsuits, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 13,
1995, at C4.
197. For a discussion of the influence of lobbyists and money on the consideration of House
Enrolled Act 1741, see Cam Simpson, Lawsuit Reform Battle Rages; Legislation Pits Consumers
Against State Businesses, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Mar. 20, 1995, at Al (detailing how four of
Indiana's top campaign contributors from 1992 lobbied extensively for or against the bill).
198. Id. at Al (describing one particular television commercial which warned of lawsuits for
improperly cutting hair); Cam Simpson, Lawsuit Reform Bill Overcomes Radio Foes, Clears House,
INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Apr. 18, 1995, at B4 (describing a last-minute radio campaign aimed at one
of the bill's opponents).
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vetoed the bill,"9 but the legislature overrode the veto. 2°°
B. Specific Provisions
House Enrolled Act 1741 became law and amended Indiana's Product
Liability and Comparative Fault Acts.2"1 The Act provides a mild sanction for
failing to settle a case where one party proposes settlement and the final
judgment amounts to less than the proposed settlement. 2 The Act also limits
punitive damage awards to the greater of three times compensatory damages or
$ 50,000.2t
If a jury awards an amount that exceeds the limitation, the court
must reduce the award.'
After a judgment including punitive damages is
entered, the judgment debtor is required to pay the punitive award to the clerk
of the court. 2" The clerk then pays the judgment creditor twenty-five percent
of the award. 2'
The remaining seventy-five percent of the award is paid to
the state treasurer, who is directed to deposit the funds into a state-administered
fund to benefit victims of violent crime.'
The jury is not to be informed of
the statutory limitation on the award or of the allocation of the award to the
state. 28
The following two cases illustrate the statute's impact. In October 1974,
the Indiana and Michigan Electric Company (IMEC) surveyed some land in
order to prepare for a proposed electrical transmission facility. 2°9 Along the
survey route, on Jack Stevenson's land, IMEC slashed twenty-three saplings and

199. Richard D. Walton, Bayh Vetoes Bills About Union Fees, Legal Reform, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Apr. 22, 1995, at CI (Bayh declared that he had no trouble limiting punitive damages but did
not want to take decision-making power from juries).
200. Richard D. Walton, Senate Follows House, Overrides Tort Reform Veto, INDIANAPOLIS
STAR, Apr. 28, 1995, at B3. The House voted to override first, with intense lobbying from former
Vice President Dan Quayle. Richard D. Walton, Quayle Weighs in on Tort Bill; Ex-Vice President
Lobbies Lawmakers to Override Veto of Lawsuit Legislation, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Apr. 27, 1995,
at BI.
201. The Act limits strict liability to manufacturing defects. Hovde, supra note 12, at 367.
Actions based on design defects or a failure to warn must now be determined according to
negligence standards. Id. The Act also enumerated defenses, including conformity with federal or
state regulations. Id. at 368. "Manufacturer" is defined by the Act, effectively limiting who may
be sued in strict liability claims. Id. at 367. Comparative fault will now apply in strict liability and
breach of warranty cases. Id. at 369-71; Petersen, supra note 12, at 28-30.
202. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-50-1 (West Supp. 1998). See Wirick and Piscione, supra note 12,
at 1103-04.
203. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West Supp. 1996).
204. Id. § 34-51-3-5.
205. Id. § 34-51-3-6(a).
206. Id. § 34-51-3-6(b)(1).
207. Id. § 34-51-3-6(b)(2).
208. Id. § 34-51-3-3.
209. Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Stevenson, 363 N.E.2d 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977).
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trees standing in the sight line of their survey. ° IMEC failed to obtain the
landowner's permission before going onto the land and cutting the saplings and
trees. 21 Stevenson brought a trespass action against IMEC and introduced
evidence that IMEC knew of other methods of surveying the land that would not
require trespass onto the farmer's property or destruction of the saplings and
trees. 21 2 IMEC was found guilty of trespass and for the destruction of
Stevenson's saplings and trees was ordered to pay $300 in compensatory and
On appeal, the damage award was
$50,000 4 in punitive damages.21 3
21
upheld.
When St. Vincent Hospital began construction of a professional building,
it used a mortar additive known as Sarabond manufactured by the Dow
Chemical Company. 1 5 When pieces of the brickwork began falling from the
building in 1976, investigations into the problem identified Sarabond as
excessively corrosive. 1 6 Subsequently, St. Vincent brought an action against
Dow .217 At trial, plaintiffs introduced evidence that Dow had knowledge of
the corrosiveness of Sarabond as early as 1970, two years before construction
of the professional building, but failed to warn purchasers of Sarabond of its

corrosiveness. 8 St. Vincent won a judgment of $1,690,895 in compensatory
221

damages and $5,000,000 in punitive damages. 1 9 On appeal, the defendants
challenged the award as excessive,' but the judgment was affirmed.22

210. Another neighboring farmer brought a similar trespass action against Indiana & Michigan
Electric for damage to his corn field. Id. at 1257. Lloyd Collins alleged that his fields sustained
$120 worth of damage when the electric company cut the corn without his permission because, like
Stevenson's saplings, the corn stood in the way of the company's sight line. Id. Collins was
awarded $60,000 in punitive damages. Id. The actions were consolidated for the sake of appeal.
Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1260.
213. Id. at 1257.
214. Id. at 1261.
215. Dow Chem. Co. v. St. Vincent Hosp., 553 N.E.2d 144 (Ind. Ct. App. 1990).
216. Id. at 146.
217. Id. at 147. St. Vincent alleged in their complaint negligence, strict liability, implied
warranty, and fraud. Id. Most importantly, however, was the issue of how much Dow knew and
when they knew it. Id.
218. Id. at 146. Dow conducted research on Sarabond after receiving reports about its
excessive corrosiveness as early as 1970. Id. As early as 1971, Dow knew that Sarabond was not
affected by rust inhibitors, yet as late as 1977 Dow made no warnings in its Sarabond sales literature
about this fact. Id.
219. Id. at 145.
220. Id. at 150. The court noted that Dow attempted to argue that the award was excessive
"via several evidentiary errors," such as tendered jury instructions. Id. Although Dow failed to
raise excessiveness as a substantive issue, the court addressed the issue, noting Dow's wealth and
its knowledge of Sarabond's corrosive properties. Id. at 151.
221. Id.
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Consider how the newly enacted Indiana scheme would apply to these two
cases. In the first action, the plaintiff would be limited to receiving the greater
of three times the compensatory damages or $50,000.222 Although the farmer
suffered low compensatory damages,223 the jury would still be allowed to
award the same amount of punitive damages as it did, or $50,000. Of this
$50,000 punitive damage award, the state would take seventy-five percent, or

$37,500, for deposit in the victims of violent crime fund.224 The remaining

twenty-five percent for the plaintiff would equal $12,500. Combined with the
compensatory award of $300, the total amount payable to the plaintiff would be
$12,800.2" The plaintiff and his attorney may have a contingency contract for
the payment of fees.226 Most contingency contracts average thirty-three
percent and may be as high as fifty percent should the judgment be
appealed.227 Of the award to the plaintiff, the attorney will be paid $5,120,
leaving $7,680 for the plaintiff.

In the second action, there is also no reduction in the amount of punitive

damages. 228
Because the statute allows the greater of three times the
compensatory damages or $50,000, the jury is allowed to award an amount of
$5,072,000. The jury awarded less than three times compensatory damages, and
no remittitur by the judge would be required. In this case, the state would
receive seventy-five percent of the $5,000,000 punitive award, or
$3,750,000.229

The plaintiff, St. Vincent, would receive the remaining

222. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-4 (West Supp. 1998).
223. Stevenson, 363 N.E.2d at 1257. The plaintiff suffered property damage, including the loss
of saplings estimated at $300. Id.
224. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-3 (West Supp. 1998).
225. Presumably, these damages are now subject to taxation. See O'Gilvie v. United States,
117 S. Ct. 452 (1996).
226. See generally SPEISER, supranote 121, § 2:1 (discussing of the contingency contract). See
also Lester Brickman, On the Relevance of the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence: Tort System
Outcomes Are PrincipallyDetermined by Lawyers' Rates of Return, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 1755
(1994) (arguing that attorneys fix their fees according to the risk associated with any given case and
then may attempt to line up expert witnesses if the potential payoff is relatively high).
227. SPEISER, supra note 121, § 2:26.
228. The awarded amount of $5 million was, until recently, the largest punitive damage award
in Indiana history. This case was appealed five years before the statutory cap was enacted. Had
the cause occurred after July 1995, a jury could have awarded three times compensatory damages,
and the award would equal $5,072,000. In July 1996, an Indiana jury awarded a plaintiff a $58
million punitive damage award against Ford Motor Co. for an accident involving a Bronco II truck.
24 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) No. 27, at 639 (July 12, 1996). The trial judge cut the award
down to $13.8 million, or the equivalent of retooling the manufacturing process to avoid the cause
of the accident. Id. The $58 million reflected the costs to change the design of each vehicle times
the number of similar vehicles sold in the United States, and the defendant argued that the reasoning
in BMW-that Ford should not have to "pay" for out-of-state vehicles-should apply. Id. The
cause originated before the inclusive date of the statute at issue in this note.
229. The state takes nothing from the compensatory award.
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twenty-five percent, or $1,250,000, plus the compensatory damages, for a total
of $2,940,895. Assuming counsel for the hospital works on retainer, there is
no percentage distribution with the attorney. However, the statute provides no
assistance from the state when the defendant appeals the award and no
compensation for the attorney who wins the award, even though the state's share
of the punitive damage award is larger than the hospital's total compensatory
and punitive damage award.
As these examples illustrate, the Indiana statutory allocation of the punitive
damage award still allows an award of some punitive damages to the plaintiff,
albeit a much smaller amount. 2" The examples also illustrate that the state
has acquired an interest in the collection of a punitive damage award.23' By
failing to expressly provide whether an attorney may collect a percentage of the
punitive damage award allocated to the state,232 and by failing to address how
a state is involved in the collection of the punitive damage award allocated to the
state,233 the statute creates ambiguities that Indiana courts will need to address.
The following Section addresses these problems with the Indiana statute.
V.

PROBLEMS WITH THE INDIANA STATUTE

The section of the Indiana statute that allocates a portion of the award to the
state does not specifically allow for attorney's fees to be taken from the state's
share. 2' The fact that the statute does not address the compensation of an

230. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
231. The text of the statute reads:
(a)
. . . when a judgment that includes a punitive damage award is entered in
a civil action, the party against whom the judgment was entered shall pay the punitive
damage award to the clerk of the court where the action is pending.
(b) Upon receiving the payment described in subsection (a), the clerk of the court
shall:
(1) pay the person to whom the punitive damages were awarded twenty-five
percent (25%) of the punitive damage award; and
(2) pay the remaining seventy-five percent (75%) of the punitive damage award
to the treasurer of the state, who shall deposit the funds into the violent crime victims
compensation fund established by IC 5-2-6.1-40.
IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (West Supp. 1998).
232. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
233. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
234. Compare IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6 (West Supp. 1998), with Oregon's allocation
statute:
Forty percent shall be paid to the prevailing party. The attorney for the prevailing
party shall be paid out of the amount allocated under this paragraph, in the amount
agreed upon between the attorney and the prevailing party. However, in no event may
more than 20 percent of the amount awarded as punitive damages be paid to the attorney
for the prevailing party.
OR. REV. STAT. § 18.540 (1)(a) (1995).
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attorney for winning punitive damages, or the payment of attorney's fees prior
to the allocation, was most likely a deliberate omission. 235 The omission
raises several questions about the plaintiff's attorney who argues the case for
punitive damages. Most likely, victorious plaintiffs who have surrendered a
portion of the damage award to the state will challenge the statute. However,
as has occurred in other states, the plaintiff's attorney working on contingency
may also challenge the statute.
The following discussion analyzes three challenges that attorneys will likely
make to the statute and is based on litigation in other states with allocation
statutes. First, in other states, allocation statutes have been challenged as a
taking of not only the plaintiff's right in a judgment, but also the attorney's
contingent right in that judgment.236 Second, attorneys have argued that such
statutes impair existing fee contracts. 237 Third, attorneys have argued that they
should be compensated based on equitable theories. 38 While these three
arguments may very well fail in Indiana as they have failed in other states, a
fourth, and more successful argument, is that the statute demands the attorney's
239
services without just compensation in violation of the Indiana Bill of Rights.
This Section concludes by examining the state's interest in the judgment that is
created by the statute, identifying problems similar to those litigated in other
states. 240
A. Challenges Unsuccessful in Other States
Although plaintiffs have challenged allocation statutes as an unconstitutional
taking of vested property rights in punitive damage awards, the plaintiffs'
attorneys have not seriously challenged such statutes as an unconstitutional
"taking." 24t For an attorney, any "right" to a judgment is a derivative right.

235. Prior bills proposed in the Indiana Senate specifically provided for attorneys to be
compensated from the amount of punitive damages allocated to the state. Senate Bill 101 provided
that an "amount of attorney's fees that may be paid from the state's share of a punitive damage
award . . .may not be greater than thirty-three and one-third percent (33 1/3%) of the state's
share." S. 101, 108th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (Ind. 1994). Senate Bill 545 was virtually identical.
S.545, 108th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (Ind. 1991). Senate Bill 606 introduced in 1991 allocated 75%
of the punitive damage award to the state but allowed a plaintiff to "retain an amount equal to
reasonable attorney's fees." S. 606, 107th Gen Ass., 1st Sess. (Ind. 1990). The bill which later
became House Enrolled Act 1741, however, made no mention of attorney's fees from the first date
of its introduction. See H.R. 1741, 109 Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1995).
236. Kirk v. Denver Publ'g Co., 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
237. Gordon v. State, 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
238. Schenck v. Minolta Office Sys., Inc., 873 P.2d 18 (Colo. Ct. App. 1993) (attorney
arguing for compensation under the "equitable fund" doctrine).
239. IND. CONST. art. 1,§ 21.
240. See infra notes 311-18 and accompanying text.
241. Kirk, 818 P.2d at 262. The court did not reach the issue.
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That is, if a plaintiff has a right to a punitive damage award, then a right exists
in the plaintiffs attorney, so long as a valid contract calls for compensating the
attorney from the award. However, this issue is likely to be resolved in Indiana
as it has been resolved in the other states that have addressed the issue.2 2
Indiana law creates a vested property right in a compensatory damage
award, 243 but Indiana courts have long held that punitive damages are not
meant to compensate the plaintiff.'
Because punitive damages are awarded
at the jury's discretion, no right to an award of punitive damages arises.245
Whether allocation statutes interfere with existing contingency fee contracts
has been raised in several cases. The plaintiff's attorney in Kirk v. Denver
Publishing Co.2 " challenged the statute based on the issue, but the court
24 7
declared the statute unconstitutional on other grounds. In Gordon v. State,
the statute at issue had been amended prior to the signing of the attorney-client
contract to read specifically that an attorney could not claim a contingent
percentage of the amount of the award allocated to the state. 248 Should the
Indiana statute be challenged by an attorney seeking to recover a percentage on
the amount allocated to the state, most likely impairment of existing contract will
be argued.
Plaintiffs' attorneys challenged the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act249 as
an impairment of their right to contract for services in Johnson v. St. Vincent
Hospital.2 ' In Johnson, the Indiana Supreme Court rejected attorney's claims
that the Medical Malpractice Act in any way impaired their right to contract
with plaintiffs, finding a reasonable exercise of the state's regulatory power and

242. See supra notes 161-73 and accompanying text.
243. Indiana, B. & W. Ry. Co. v. Allen, 15 N.E. 451 (Ind. 1888).
244. Miller Brewing Co. v. Best Beers of Bloomington, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 975 (Ind. 1993) (no
right to punitive damages); Carroll v. Statesman Ins. Co., 509 N.E.2d 825 (Ind. 1987) (punitive
damages not meant to compensate victim); Orkin Exterminating Co. v. Traina, 486 N.E.2d 1019
(Ind. 1986) (punitive damages are meant to deter defendant from engaging in egregious conduct and
not meant as compensation).
245. See Budget Car Sales v. Stott, 656 N.E.2d 261 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (additional damages
beyond amount to compensate the victim a "windfall").
246. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
247. 608 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1992).
248. Id. at 802. See supra note 187.
249. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-1-1 (West Supp. 1998). The Act limited recovery in malpractice
actions to $500,000 (now $750,000). IND. CODE ANN. § 34-18-14-3 (West Supp. 1998). See also
Kinney et al., supra note 52 (analyzing Indiana malpractice claims after enactment of the Act with
similar claims in surrounding states).
250. 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980). Challenges to the Act ranged from violations of due process
and equal protection to legislative usurpation of the judicial role. Id. at 590. The Act limited
plaintiffs' attorneys to 15% of the damages after the first $100,000. Id. at 602.
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Reducing needless
a valid legislative purpose furthered by the limitation."
punitive damage litigation is likely to be argued as a valid legislative purpose.
Limiting the amount of recovery an attorney may take from the amount allocated
to the state is likely to be considered a rational exercise of the state's regulatory
power.
The equitable argument for compensating attorneys who successfully win
The elements involved in a
punitive damage awards is quasi-contract."
quasi-contract claim for relief include: (1) work performed (2) without a contract
(3) where denying compensation would render an injustice.1 3 In Timothy F.
Kelly and Associates v. Illinois Farmers Insurance,"4 an attorney sought
compensation for a settlement reached between the victims of an automobile
accident and the defendant's insurer, claiming that the subrogation statute2'
gave attorneys the right to receive compensation on settlements.156 The
attorney also argued that he was entitled to compensation on the theory of quasicontract."s7 The court rejected the argument saying that, while quasi-contract
operates to promote equity where there has been some unjust enrichment, the
attorney could prove no express or implied request for services. 21' Like the
attorney in Kelly, an attorney arguing that quasi-contract requires the payment
of fees on the amount allocated to the state must argue that the statute creates
the implied request for services. A better argument is that the statute effects a
taking of the attorney's services without compensation.
B. Taking the Attorney's ParticularServices Without Just Compensation
The section of the Indiana statute that allocates a portion of the punitive
damage to the state does not specifically allow the winning attorney to collect
fees on the state's share. An argument that may allow for compensation, which

251. Id. at 603. The court cited Buckler v. Hilt, 200 N.E. 219 (Ind. 1936), which held that
a statute limiting the amount an attorney could charge in a workmen's compensation case did not
violate due process or equal protection. Johnson, 404 N.E.2d at 603.
252. 1 SAMUEL WILLISTON & WALTER H.E. JAEGER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS § 1:6 (4th ed. 1990) (calling quasi-contractual obligations "restitutionary in nature, with
the goal of the courts being to award the plaintiff the reasonable value of the benefit conferred upon
the defendant").
253. Indianapolis v. Twin Lakes Enters., Inc., 568 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). The
court discusses the difference between quasi-contract and quantum meruit. Id. at 1078.
254. 640 N.E.2d 82 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994).
255. IND. CODE ANN. § 34-53-1-2 (West Supp. 1998).
256. Kelly, 640 N.E.2d at 84.
257. Id. at 85.
258. Id. at 86.
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has not been raised and may be unique to Indiana, 2 9 is that the statute
constitutes a taking of the attorney's services without just compensation in
violation of the Indiana Constitution, Article 1, Section 21. This Section of the
Note will analyze the unique problem of the Particular Services Clause of the
Indiana Constitution. This Section concludes that the statute's failure to provide
attorney's fees on the share allocated to the state makes the statute an
unconstitutional "demand" on the attorney's particular services without just
compensation.
The Particular Services Clause of the Indiana Constitution prevents the state
from demanding the particular services of an individual that could not be
demanded of any other class of citizens without offering just compensation.2
Thus, while the state can demand that a person serve on a jury, the state cannot
demand that a doctor serve as an expert witness in a criminal trial. 26' The test
established by the Indiana Supreme Court in Bayh v. Sonnenburg262 determines
whether a person's particular services have been demanded without just
compensation. In Sonnenburg, a group of mental patients sought payment for
tasks performed while hospitalized at state mental institutions.2 63 The patients
sought recovery on six theories of relief, including claims under the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 2" the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, 42
U.S.C. § 1983, a common law claim of unjust enrichment, and state claims
under the Indiana Patient Remuneration act. The plaintiffs also alleged a
violation of the Indiana Constitution's Particular Services Clause. 2'
The
Sonnenburg court dismissed the other claims individually but spent considerable

259. Only Indiana, Oregon, and Tennessee have such constitutional prohibitions against taking
a person's particular services. See IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21; OR. CONST. art. I, § 18; TN. CONST.
art. I, § 21. While Oregon has enacted an allocation statute, there has been no litigation about the
statute taking an attorney's particular services.
260. IND. CONST. art. 1, § 21 reads in part: "No person's particular services shall be demanded
without just compensation." Section 21 also contains the state "takings" clause: "No person's
property shall be taken by law, without just compensation; nor, except in the case of the State,
without such compensation first assessed and tendered." The "takings" clause has received much
more attention than the Particular Services Clause, for obvious reasons, serving as the cognate of
the federal Fifth Amendment. The only scholarly analysis of the Particular Services Clause of
Section 21 is Robert Twomley, The Indiana Bill of Rights, 20 IND. L.J. 211, 248-49 (1945).
261. Twomley, supra note 260, at 248.
262. 573 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. 1991).
263. The class was certified at 7419 patients, who requested compensation for such tasks as
cooking and serving meals, washing dishes, cutting hair, mowing lawns, laundry, maintaining
bowling alleys, and providing services to fellow patients. Id. at 412.
264. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207 (1988).
265. Orr v. Sonnenburg, 542 N.E.2d 201, 203-04 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
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effort on the particular services claim.2" In order to prevail on the claim that
the state demanded services without just compensation, the plaintiffs had to
demonstrate: (1) that they performed particular services (2) demanded by the
state (3) without just compensation.267 According to the court, the plaintiff
group in Sonnenburg failed to meet this burden.
The first issue was whether the services that the patients performed could
be characterized as particular services within the meaning of Article 1, Section
21.268 The court then engaged in a lengthy analysis of the re-drafting of the
1851 version of the Indiana Constitution that led to the phrase "particular
services" being retained from the 1816 version of the Indiana Constitution. 2"
In doing so, the court sought to interpret the Indiana Constitution in a way to
reconcile the meaning of those who drafted the constitution with those who
ratified it.27° The court concluded that services were "particular" for the
purposes of the amendment if they had historically been compensated 7" and

266. As for the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' contention that the
named defendants were "persons" for the purposes of the statute. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 403.
The plaintiffs could not claim a violation of the Indiana Patient Remuneration Act because the
remuneration schedule had not gone into effect when the cause accrued. Id. at 404. The court
hesitated to apply the Fair Labor Standards Act retroactively because of the ruling in National
League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Id. at 408. As for the unjust enrichment claim,
the Court concluded that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate an expectation of payment at the same
time they were claiming to be coerced into rendering services. Id. at 408. Finally, the Court could
not affirm the trial court on the Thirteenth Amendment issue. Id. at 411.
267. Id. at 411.
268. Id.
269. See 1 DEBATES IN INDIANA CONVENTION 1850, at 353-75 (1850). The debate continued
for several days, with some delegates wishing to replace the phrase "particular services" with
"personal services." Id. at 359 (remarks of Delegate Clark) ("I take it that the word particular,in
the old Constitution, means, not that general service which every citizen is bound to render, but
something specific"). See also 1 CHARLES KETTLEBOROUGH, CONSTITUIMON MAKING IN INDIANA
300 (1916) (1971 reprint).
270. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 412. See Rosalie Berger Levinson, State and Federal
ConstitutionalLaw Developments Affecting Indiana Law, 25 IND. L. REV. 1129, 1134 (1991)
(commenting that the Sonnenburg case "suggests the significance of re-examining the report of the
debates and proceedings of the 1850 convention as a means of rejuvenating and providing substance
to Indiana's Bill of Rights"). See also Randall T. Shepard, Indiana Law, the Supreme Court, and
a New Decade, 24 IND. L. REV. 499, 504 (1991) (recognizing in the late 1980's a willingness of
the Indiana Supreme Court to resolve issues with the Indiana Bill of Rights that previously would
have been resolved only by reference to the U.S. Constitution). See also Randall T. Shepard,
Second Wind for the Indiana Bill of Rights, 22 IND. L. REV. 575, 578 (1989) (noting that over "a
century before Gideon v. Wainwright was decided in 1963, the Indiana Supreme Court held that a
criminal defendant had the right to an attorney at public expense" under section 21 of the Indiana
Bill of Rights).
271. The court determined that the 1850 Convention's "preference for 'particular' over
'personal' is critical in this case. It is clear that the framers did not intend this clause to create new
rights to compensation for services provided to the State that had gone historically uncompensated."
Id. at 413.
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could not be considered "general" services. 27' Because no history existed of
paying patients for the work performed, and because the work was not the result
of an unreasonable demand upon the patients, the services performed by the
plaintiffs were not "particular. " "73
The court determined that the evidence suggested that the state placed a
"demand" for the services performed by the patients. 274 Some of the patients
had testified that they felt threatened into doing the work or felt they would be
punished if they refused. 5 Thus, because the patients reasonably felt that a
refusal to do the work might result in physical violence or other intimidation,
the court concluded that the services were performed because of a demand.276
However, the Sonnenburg court rejected the patients' claim that they were
denied "just compensation" for the work they performed, citing the benefits that
the patients received as part of their incarceration. 2 7 Under Indiana's Just
Compensation Clause, the court pointed out that, where the value of the
extrinsic benefits received is greater than the value of the services
or property
27
demanded of the individual, the state owes no compensation. 1
This three-part approach to the Particular Services Clause established in
Sonnenburg was applied by the Indiana Court of Appeals in Gorka v.
Sullivan'7 in 1996. Gorka involved a plaintiff group challenging the Medicaid
agency's transportation rates on a number of grounds, including the Particular

272. The court considered work done as "part of the social compact" to be "general services."
Id. at 416. To recover, the plaintiffs would have had to show that the work they performed was the
result of "the State's isolated and unreasonable demand upon their services which ought to be paid
for by the public at large." Id. Further, the court felt that the patients were the "primary
beneficiaries of the work product." Id. Thus, the services were general and not particular.
273. Id. at 417.
274. Id. at 418.
275. Id. at 417-18. Although none of the patients who testified at the trial actually refused to
work, they testified about feeling coerced and that they believed that patients who did refuse suffered
drastic consequences. Id. at 417.
276. According to the court, "[a] request becomes a 'demand' when it is backed up with the
use or threatened use of physical force or legal process which creates in the citizen a reasonable
belief that he is not free to refuse the request." Id.
277. The court referred to the improved living environment which resulted from the work
performed. Id. at 420. In addition, the court noted that the costs associated with housing and
providing for the patients more than outweighed the amount of payment sought: "Although there is
no direct evidence from which to calculate the exact worth of the first of these two benefits, it is
apparent that the two combined exceed the value of the plaintiffs' labor." Id. at 421.
278. Id.
279. 671 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
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Services Clause. 2w In this case, the issue was whether the state had actually
demanded the services of the transportation providers. Because the providers
voluntarily assented to the contracts to provide transportation, the court held that
no "demand" of the services was made. 2"'
An attorney challenging the Indiana allocation statute as an unconstitutional
taking of particular services will need to meet the three-part test established by
Sonnenburg and followed in Gorka. The attorney whose fee has been allocated
to the state without compensation must establish: (1) that the services performed
were particular services (2) demanded by the state (3) without just
compensation. 2" In the right situation, the statute may be declared
unconstitutional. The following analysis demonstrates how.
Indiana case law has consistently recognized that attorneys' services may
not be demanded without just compensation because these are "particular"
services, as opposed to general services. 2" However, the last case to rule this

280. A group of Medicaid transportation providers brought an action against the Medicaid
agency in Marion County after new, lower rates were announced. Id. at 124. The providers
claimed that the rates should have been established by the Indiana Department of Revenue. Id. at
124-25. The providers asked for the higher rates which would have been paid them under the old
system and challenged the role-making procedure which led to the lower rates. Id. Because the
providers considered the lower rates a taking of their services without just compensation, Article 1,
Section 21 of the Indiana Bill of Rights was invoked. Id. at 130.
281. "Here the State has requested the Providers' services by offering a contract to transport
Medicaid patients. The Providers were free to reject the offer, or to cancel their existing contracts.
The freedom to reject the offer or cancel the contract establishes that the State has not demanded the
Providers' services." Id. at 131.
282. Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 411 (Ind. 1991).
283. See Twomley, supra note 260, at 249 (noting "an attorney's services are 'particular'
services"). The case law is plentiful, beginning with Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13 (1854), where an
attorney who defended a man against burglary charges filed a petition to recover the $25 allowance
set aside by the county. Id. at 14. The auditor of the county refused to order payment, saying the
county did not have the authority to issue payment for the defense of a pauper. Id. The court
ordered payment, citing Article 1. Section 21 of the Indiana Bill of Rights and rejecting the idea that
an attorney's services could be gratuitously expected by the county or labeled an "honorary duty."
Id. at 16. The court noted the changing role of the profession: "The legal profession having been
thus properly stripped of all its odious distinctions and peculiar emoluments, the public can no longer
justly demand of that class of citizens any gratuitous services which would not be demandable of
every other class." Id. at 16-17.
The constitutional prohibition against demanding the particular services of attorneys has been
held to apply mainly in cases of defending paupers. See, e.g., Knox County Council v. State ex rel.
McCormick, 29 N.E.2d 405 (Ind. 1940) (attorneys brought action to compel county for payment of
costs and fees for defending pauper defendant in murder trial); Knight v. Board of Comm'rs, 179
Ind. 568 (1913) (although attorneys not required to defend suspect without compensation, attorneys
voluntarily assisted suspect; thus State did not demand services).
The prohibition against taking an attorney's services also applies to assisting the county in a
prosecution. See Board of Comm'rs v. McGregor, 171 Ind. 634 (1908) (no recovery of attorney's
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way was decided in 1940, and the majority of the cases that have so held
concerned payment of counsel for defending paupers against criminal
charges. 2s4 "Particular services" as defined by the Sonnenburg court means
(1) services that have historically been compensated and (2) services that are not
general services, do not place an unreasonable demand upon the individual, and
do not solely benefit the individual. 2s8 The attorney who argues for an award
of punitive damages can claim to have been historically compensated for winning
such awards, but only when they have been awarded in full to the plaintiff.
When the punitive damage award becomes a fine, the plaintiffs attorney
becomes, in a sense, a fine collector for the state.2" On the other hand, the
attorney could also be considered a quasi-attorney general, 28' arguing cases on
the state's behalf to deter and punish the egregious behavior of certain
defendants. This task may not be an unreasonable demand upon the attorney,

fees warranted where attorney voluntarily assisted the county in the prosecution of a murder
suspect). The court in McGregor noted "[t]he State is abundantly able to compensate all of its
servants, and should make provision for such services as may be deemed necessary in the interests
of the public peace and welfare." Id. at 641.
284. But see Hoey v. McCarthy, 124 Ind. 464 (1890). In Hoey, the plaintiff sought to bring
a civil action informa pauperis under a state statute which allowed such actions to state residents.
Id. at 464. Because the plaintiff was allegedly not a state resident, the complaint was dismissed.
Id. at 465. Under the statute, costs would be paid, and the plaintiff would be appointed an attorney.
Id. The court refused to appoint counsel, noting:
There is probably no profession where benefactions to the poor, in the way of gratuitous
services, as well as in other material respects, exceed those of the legal profession, and
while an attorney can not, even upon the order of the court be compelled to render
services gratuitously (Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13), it may be doubted whether a suitor
with a meritorious cause ever failed to secure a hearing because of his inability to
employ an advocate.
Id. at 466.
285. Bayh v. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d 398, 414-16 (Ind. 1991). The court interpreted the
drafters of the 1850 Constitution as being especially concerned with creating "new rights to
compensation for services provided to the State that had gone historically uncompensated." Id. at
413.
286. Case law in Indiana suggests that the clause does not apply to those who are made to
collect excise taxes or income taxes for the state. Such is not a "particular service" demanded and
deserving of just compensation. See Welsh v. Sells, 192 N.E.2d 753 (Ind. 1963) (rejecting
challenge to excise tax as violation of Article 1, Section 21 because no party to the action could
claim to have rights violated); Akers v. Handley, 149 N.E.2d 692 (Ind. 1958) (cleaners sought
injunctive relief from Indiana Revenue Board that withholding income taxes was a violation of
Article 1, Section 37, the Involuntary Servitude Clause of the Indiana Constitution). The Akers
court quoted favorably from an Illinois case, Crews v. Lundquist, 197 N.E. 768 (I11.1935), which
denied a public administrator's claim for compensation for handling the estate of a deceased war
veteran, even though a statute allowed for veterans' estates to be handled free of charge. Id. at 769,
772. The administrator brought the challenge under the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 772.
287. See Owen, supra note 2, at 380-81 (discussing the law enforcement function of a punitive
damages award; awarding punitive damages to a plaintiff rewards those who do a public good in
deterring egregious conduct).
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and certainly the attorney receives some compensation that benefits the
attorney.288 But, it is possible to conceive of a situation where the state
receives a majority of the benefit from the attorney's work product, especially
for the attorney being paid a percentage of the damage award, when
compensatory damages are low but punitive damages are high.289 In this
situation, the attorney is not the sole recipient of the benefit, and the state's
demand upon the attorney's time and effort appears to be unreasonable.
The second prong of the Sonnenburg "particular services" test requires the
party to demonstrate that its services were demanded by the state in a manner
that would suggest that the individual was unable to refuse because of threat of
force or legal action. 2'
In Sonnenburg, the Indiana Supreme Court agreed
that some of the patients may have felt like they had no choice but to do the
work under threat of violence or coercion.2 9 However, the Indiana Court of
Appeals in Gorka v. Sullivan2" rejected a claim that the services of the
transportation providers were "demanded," calling attention to the freedom of
contract and the option to cancel the Medicaid contract. 2" While attorneys do
not have to argue for punitive damages, those who do are placed in service to
the state by the statute. The attorney who refuses to argue for punitive damages
is under no threat, but the attorney has no option to cancel the "contract" with
the state in the event punitive damages are argued and awarded. The "contract"
operates by law, providing, as the court in Sonnenburg said, "the use, or
threatened use of. . .legal process which creates in the citizen a reasonable
belief that he is not free to refuse the request. " 294 A statute that limited
attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases survived scrutiny under the
Particular Services Clause in Buckler v. Hilt.2 95 This case, however, appears
to have misstated Indiana law when it announced that Article 1, Section 21
"applies only to the taking of private property under the power of eminent

288. The argument in Sonnenburg was that the plaintiffs were the sole beneficiaries of the work
performed. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 416.
289. The hypothetical situation at the beginning of this note serves as a good example of this
possible situation, where the amount awarded to the state is much higher than the amount awarded
to the plaintiff, and the time necessary to spend on the case outweighs the potential payout for the
attorney. See also Indiana & Mich. Elec. Co. v. Stevenson, 363 N.E.2d 1254 (Ind. Ct. App. 1977),
discussed supra notes 209-29 and accompanying text (compensatory damages of $300 and $120,
punitive damages of $50,000 and $60,000 respectively).
290. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 417.
291. Id. at 418 (referring to the rumors of loss of privileges, isolation, and electric shock which
created the impression in the patients' minds that they were not free to refuse the demands to work).
292. 671 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
293. Id. at 131.
294. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 417.
295. 200 N.E. 219 (Ind. 1936).
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domain."2% Many cases in Indiana have announced that the Particular
Services Clause is applicable to an individual's services demanded by the state,
including Bayh v. Sonnenburg"7 and Gorka v. Sullivan,'98 the most recent
cases. 299

The final element of the Sonnenburg test is to determine if the plaintiff has
been adequately compensated by the extrinsic benefits of the services
performed.3w The plaintiffs in Sonnenburg failed to meet this burden because
the court found that the patients were the sole beneficiaries of the work
performed." ° An award of punitive damages under the Indiana allocation
statute benefits the state, the plaintiff, and the plaintiff's attorney, if working on
Unlike the plaintiffs in Sonnenburg, the plaintiffs attorney
contingency.'
can claim that the state's demand interferes with his ability to make a living.'
C. Ethical Conflicts Between Attorneys and Clients
If Indiana courts do not interpret the statute to allow reasonable
compensation for the attorney for arguing the case for punitive damages,
punitive damages claims might not be sought.'
Attorneys working on
contingency fee cases, especially, will evaluate whether it is better to argue for
punitive damages that would be awarded to the state or, instead, to try to

296. Few decisions have cited to Buckler, but one which does is noteworthy. In Johnson v. St.
Vincent Hosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980), the Indiana Supreme Court upheld the Indiana
medical malpractice cap, but the case also involved an attorney's claim for fees beyond the limit
prescribed by the statute. The Johnson court cited Buckler as standing for the proposition that
limitations on attorney's fees is a valid exercise of the State's police power. Id. at 603. The
attorney also argued that the statute interfered with the right to contract. Id. at 602.
297. 573 N.E.2d 398 (Ind. 1991).
298. 671 N.E.2d 122 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996).
299. The Sonnenburg court acknowledged that the Particular Services Clause has been applied
to attorneys. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 414.
300. See supra notes 277-78 and accompanying text.
301. Sonnenburg, 573 N.E.2d at 420-21.
302. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text.
303. The Sonnenburg court stated that "one of the purposes of the particular services clause is
to protect a citizen's ability to earn a living, services that do not interfere with that ability have
usually been characterized as general." Id. at 417. This line of reasoning seems to comport with
the older cases which distinguished between "particular" and "general" services as splitting along
the issue of what could be expected of everyone as opposed to what could only be expected of a
select group of citizens. See Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 17 (1854) (stating "the public can no longer
justly demand of that class of citizens any gratuitous services which would not be demandable of
every other class").
304. Wirick and Piscione, supra note 12, at 1102.
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increase compensatory damages.m
Under either type of damage
award-compensatory or punitive-the defendant will still pay. Where that
award goes is more important to the plaintiff and the attorney.'
Because the
Indiana statute does not contain a provision like the Florida statute at issue in
Sontag v. State Department of Banking and Finance, allowing the state to
recover regardless of whether the parties have settled, the statute must be
interpreted as either giving the state an interest in the settlement or not.3 s8
Attorneys, and their clients, may be more willing to settle before going to trial
to avoid having the state assert its interest in the award.'
There is also the concern of attorneys taking advantage of clients during the
fee contract drafting stage. Indiana's statute, unlike the other allocation statutes,
310
does not clearly define from which portion an attorney's fee may be taken.
While an attorney and client may come to an agreement that the fee will be
taken from the "total judgment," fee contracts will need to specify whether an
attorney can receive compensation based on the total amount, including that
amount awarded to the state, regardless of the amount eventually awarded to the
plaintiff.
D. The State as Non-Party Judgment Creditor
The two courts that have dealt with the state's interest in an award of
punitive damages reflect the growing acceptance of such statutory schemes.
Finley v. Empiregas Inc.3" ' held that, while the statute allocating a portion of
punitive damages to the state was constitutional, the district court was under no
305. Id. Wirick and Piscione argue that punitive damages claims will drop out of the action
when the parties fail to settle. Instead, the attorney will make a concerted effort to argue for
intangible loss, like aggravated pain and suffering. Id. Wirick and Piscione state: "Plaintiffs may
decide that aggravating factors which might otherwise justify punitive damages could be used instead
to increase compensatory damages." Id. at 1102. See also Breslo, supra note 47, at 1152
(maintaining that attorneys working on contingency influence client decisions; thus settlement is
usually a decision based on rate of return).
306. See Breslo, supra note 47, at 1152-53 (concluding that it is unclear whether a plaintiff's
attorney would be more or less willing to bring a claim for punitive damages under an allocation
statute).
307. 669 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
308. See infra notes 311-18 and accompanying text.
309. Wirick and Piscione ask when the state may assert its "enforceable property interest."
Wirick and Piscione, supra note 12, at 1102. Presumably, however, the state would not have an
enforceable property interest in a punitive damages award, just as no plaintiff has such an
enforceable property interest in an award of punitive damages. See supra notes 241-45 and
accompanying text.
310. See supra notes 174-84 and accompanying text.
311. 28 F.3d 782 (8th Cir. 1994).
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statutory obligation to allow the state to intervene. 1 2 This case demonstrates
the importance of precision in such statutes. While a definite state interest is
created in the allocation of the award, there is no mechanism for the state to
collect its share.3" 3 The Indiana statute does not allow for the state to
intervene in an action at any stage of the proceeding.
Sontag v. State Department of Banking & Finance"4 also illustrates the
importance of precise statutory language. After a judgment was entered but
before the satisfaction of judgment, the two parties agreed to a settlement that
did not include the amount of punitive damages to be awarded to the state under
the Florida statute." 5 The state subsequently brought an action to recover its
sixty percent share under the statute.31 6 In affirming a grant of summary
judgment for the state, the court agreed with the trial court's assessment of the
situation: "the settlement agreement and the satisfaction of judgment were a
subterfuge to dispossess the Department of its portion of the award of punitive
damages."37 Although the Indiana statute specifically routes the payment of
the punitive damage award from the defendant to the clerk of the court, there
is no provision for allocating any awards resulting from settlement offers that
occur after the verdict but before the satisfaction of the judgment.3"8

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
judgment

Id. at 784-85.
Id.
669 So. 2d 283 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West 1997).
Id.
Sontag, 669 So. 2d at 284. The statute was amended to include pre-satisfaction of
settlements. The statute now reads:
A settlement agreement entered into between the original parties to the action after
a verdict has been returned must provide a proportionate share payable to the fund
specified in paragraph (2) (b). For purposes of this subsection, a proportionate share
is a 35-percent share of that percentage of the settlement amount which the punitive
damages portion of the verdict bore to the total of the compensatory and punitive
damages in the verdict.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (West Supp. 1997). Apparently, the Florida legislature realized that
parties could avoid payment of any amount of the share to the state simply by coming to a settlement
after the verdict was reached, but before the judgment was "satisfied" in the court. This was the
case with the parties in Sontag.
318. The statute provides that "when a judgment that includes a punitive damage award is
entered in a civil action," the defendant "shall pay the punitive damage award to the clerk of the
court." IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-6(a) (West Supp. 1998). A defendant could appeal the
judgment, and in the intervening time the plaintiff and the defendant could settle as occurred in
Sontag. Presumably, the State becomes a party to the action at final judgment and has an interest
in the judgment at that time, regardless of whether an appeal is taken. Interest on the punitive
damage award would not be available for the period between the final judgment and the
consideration of the appeal. See IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-4-3 (West Supp. 1998).
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PROPOSAL TO REFORM INDIANA'S ALLOCATION STATUTE

With the exception of the Particular Services Clause, the issues discussed
above3 9 have been litigated in other states with allocation statutes. The
Colorado statute struck down in Kirk v. Denver Publishing Co. 320 was flawed
for a number of reasons, according to the Colorado Supreme Court, but
especially because it constituted a taking of the plaintiffs vested property
interest.321 The Florida, Georgia, and Iowa statutes, however, have survived
such constitutional challenges. 31 The lesson to be taken from those cases is
that, although an allocation statute does not amount to a taking of a plaintiff's
vested property interest, the statute must make clear the state's involvement in
the judgment and include a method of collecting payment in the case of presatisfaction of judgment settlements. 323 In addition, allocation statutes should
clearly identify how the attorney who argues the case for punitive damages,
which will be allocated to the state, is to be compensated for the effort.
Otherwise, such statutes create ethical conflicts between the attorney and the
client at the fee contract and settlement stages of litigation, or may result in
punitive damages not being argued at all. 324 In Indiana, failing to provide
compensation for the attorney in service to the state makes the allocation statute
illegal as a "taking" of the attorney's particular services.'
This Note
proposes several changes to the statute to balance these concerns with the
legitimate goals of Indiana's allocation statute. Furthermore, this Note proposes
to clear up ambiguous provisions in order to compensate the attorney for the
effort expended to win the award and make clear the extent of the state's interest
in the award in case of a settlement offer before judgment is satisfied.
A. Compensating Attorneys
Proposal1
(a)After ajury determination of the amount ofpunitive damages,
which shall not exceed the greater of three times compensatory or

319. See supra part V(A).
320. 818 P.2d 262 (Colo. 1991).
321. Id. at 265.
322. See supra notes 148-73 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 185-95 and accompanying text.
324. See supra notes 304-10 and accompanying text. See also Breslo, supra note 47 (detailing
the "ramifications of a plan that retains punitive damages, but does not give the award to the
plaintiff"). Breslo examines several alternatives to awarding punitive damages to the plaintiff,
including having the state take over as prosecutor in a separate action. Id. at 1148. Breslo identifies
procedural difficulties with that solution, including the realities associated with attorneys working
on contingency and the effects such a plan would have on settlement conferences. Id. at 1157.
325. See supra notes 259-303 and accompanying text.
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$50,000, the trialjudge shalldivide the awardofdamages between the
Victims of Violent Crime Fund and the plaintiff, based on a
determination of the following factors:
(1) the extent to which the plaintiff is fully compensated after
receiving compensatory damages and paying litigation costs;
(2) the time and effort spent by the plaintiff's attorney arguingthe
case for punitive damages.
(b) If the defendant's egregiousbehavior was directedspecifically
at the plaintiff, the judge may award the entire amount to the plaintiff.
Proposal 2
(a)A jury award of punitive damages may not exceed the greater
of three times compensatory damages or $50,000. After a jury
determinationofpunitive damages, the court shall orderthe defendant
to pay to the clerk of the court the full amount of punitive damage.
(b) The clerk of the court shall then divide the punitive damage
award in the following manner:
(1) Seventy-five percent to the Victims of Violent Crime Fund;
(2) The remaining twenty-five percent to the plaintiff.
(c) The administratorof the Victims of Violent Crime Fund shall
award the attorney who argued the claim for punitive damages a
reasonable fee, not to exceed, in total, thirty-three percent of the
award allocated to the Fund.
Commentary
The current Indiana statute does not mention compensating the successful
attorney for arguing the case for punitive damages where a defendant's conduct
has been especially deserving of punishment and deterrence.32 6 Common
sense would dictate that if attorneys do not consider the time and effort
worthwhile, the time and effort will not be expended.327 Cases will be
examined based on the rate of return, and defendants in actions like the
hypothetical at the beginning of this Note32 will go unpunished. Because no
right to an award of punitive damages exists, states may eliminate their
recovery.329 Indiana could have legislatively determined to eliminate punitive
damages, but instead decided to retain such damages to punish and deter
egregious behavior.

326. See supra notes 234-35 and accompanying text.
327. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
328. See supra note I and accompanying text.
329. See supra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
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The first proposed statute allows the judge a vast amount of discretion to
determine where the award goes, and how much to compensate the attorney
arguing the case. In some ways, it resembles the Illinois statute,3 " which
allows the judge to award as much or as little of the punitive damage award to
the plaintiff and gives the judge discretion on how the plaintiff's attorney shall
be compensated. However, such a statute does not clearly establish, for
purposes of planning litigation, what type of fee an attorney will take from any
given case, unless the case involves tortious behavior directed specifically at the
331
plaintiff.
The second proposed statute resembles Indiana House and Senate bills that
were not enacted in favor of the current statute. 332 In this proposal, the state
fund is required to reimburse the attorney for arguing the case. Like any client,
the state may not be merely a passive beneficiary. The attorney's services
would not be taken by the state without just compensation, and the attorney
would be able to structure a fee agreement with the plaintiffs in reliance upon
a potential recovery from the amount paid to the state.
B. The State's Interest
Proposal
(a) The state's interest in a punitive damage awardas determined
in sections (a) and (b) shall vest at the time of the verdict.
(b) Any settlements between the defendant and the plaintiffafter
the determination of a verdict imposing punitive damages shall be
subject to the trial court's determination of the state's interest in the
award.
(c) The state shall not participatein any action under this section
at any time to recover its share of a judgment of punitive damages.
Commentary
The other concern of this Note is the state's interest in the award before the
judgment is satisfied. The proposal makes clear to litigants what will happen
should they try to settle after a verdict is rendered, but before the judgment is
satisfied. At the point a verdict is handed down, litigants should not be able to
try to escape payment of a portion of the award to the state. 333 Ample

330. 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West Supp. 1996).
331. In which case, the award would resemble Iowa's statute. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A. 1
(2)(b) (West 1987).
332. See supra note 235.
333. See supra notes 185-91 and accompanying text.
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opportunities for settlement arise before trial, and the proposed amendment
encourages those settlements to occur before trial. Plaintiffs with legitimate
punitive damage claims will be able to collect those damages without awarding
a portion to the state, and plaintiffs' attorneys will be more likely to take
settlement offers seriously.3 " In addition, the proposal makes it clear that the
to intervene in an action involving punitive damages, even on
state is not
5

appeal.

33

VII. CONCLUSION

Regardless of the accuracy of claims of a nationwide "litigation explosion"
or "tort crisis," legitimate concerns about awarding quasi-criminal damages to
the plaintiff in a civil action rather than the state will lead other states to reform
their tort liability systems to award punitive damages to the state. If punitive
damages are meant to punish reprehensible conduct and deter its occurrence in
the future, reformers will continue to argue that the same result will follow
awarding those damages to the state. After all, the consensus is that punitive
damages are not meant as compensation for the plaintiff, and the defendant
paying damages is not concerned with who gets paid.
But, because some reprehensible conduct cannot be punished if plaintiffs do
not bring claims, the tort liability system should not discourage its "private
attorneys general" from bringing legitimate claims. Unfortunately, as this Note
suggests, the Indiana tort reforms in 1995 have the effect of stifling legitimate
claims by effectively limiting the amount of return an attorney can realize in a
case involving punitive damages. Further, the Indiana split recovery statute does
so in an ambiguous manner that necessitates further legislative action or judicial
interpretation. This Note proposes changes in the Indiana split recovery statute
that draws upon the experiences of other states that have enacted such statutes.
Punitive damages exist to discourage reprehensible conduct; limitations on
punitive damages should not serve to encourage reprehensible conduct.
Charles F.G. Parkinson
334. See Breslo, supra note 47, at 1152.
335. See supra note 318.
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